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General Education:
An Essay 1n Definition*
By EDWARD B. BLACKMAN

To the ancient city of Delphi mighty rulers came to place before
the oracular priestess great questions of war and peace; and humble
shepherds came to ask where a lost little sheep might be found.1 On
this sacred soil, then regarded by many as the very center of the world,
stood a temple dedicated to Apollo, god of wisdom and patron god
of Delphi nine months of the year. Three inscriptions carved into the
walls of the temple are known to us. One is of minor consequence,
having to do with lending money to friends, and is rarely quoted.
Another enjoins: " Nothing in excess"-a command tha t was to
characterize much of Greek behavior and Greek culture during the
Golden Age. (One must add , in all fairness, that this was a n ideal to be
sought after, rather than a n ideal securely achieved.) 2 The third saying
is of greatest interest here : "Know thyself." I n a mere two Greek
words we a re told to discard illusions about ourselves, to know
ourselves as we really a re. In the language of the modern sociologist,
we are to have a self-image that is " true" to reality.3 And to those

*

Prepared for the Iowa Coordinating Council and reprin ted with th eir
p ermission, but not necessarily reflecting their views.
1. Herbert W. Parke and D. E . W . Wormell, The D elphic Oracle, 2 vols,
Oxford, 1956. This book contains both a fascinating historica l account
and a la rge number of oracular responses.
2. Finley A. Hooper , Greek R ealities: L ife and Thought in Ancient Greece,
Scribner, 196 7. The best historica l work on ancient Greece now ava ilable,
it h as the virtue of di stinguishing clearly b etween the idea l and the real.
3. Wilbur B. Brookover, and others, Self-Concept of Ab ility .a nd S chool
Achievement, Office of R esearch a nd Publications, Michigan State University, 1962. This book is a major contribution to the concep t of the
self-image.
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deities of the twentieth century known as psychiatrists, we are to
"work through" our problems, recall childhood traumas, dispel the
layers of illusion that conceal our "real" personalities, and (hopefully)
emerge with a saving self-knowledge that will free us of mental ills.
An attractive but ill-fated opponent of self-deception was Socrates,
who spent a lifetime challenging men to examine their inner selves,
to see if they really cared about the "nurture of the soul" and were
not misled by the temptations of worldly goods.4 In 399 B.C. the
Athenians forced him to drink the fatal hemlock.
Few people care to have their illusions about themselves exposed,
for the process is painful and the consequences often very unflattering. John Stuart Mill said, in reference to the death of Socrates, "I
would rather be Socrates dissatisfied (disillusioned) than a pig
satisfied." But even as men pay money to psychiatrists to help them
gently uncover the illusory, so they pay money for courses which, taken
collectively, often shatter rather brutally beliefs which some students
have long cherished about themselves. The persona thus exposed, the
painful catharsis endured, the myths and self-deceptions smashed, the
student is presumably ready now to face the truth about himself and
to discover what is so desperately sought after these days, self-identity.
This found , feelings of alienation and anxiety will take flight.5
Probably few professors would reject the general picture sketched
here- though some might well feel that a very serious matter was
being treated with an improperly light touch. Of course the matter
is serious, and many professors derive substantial satisfaction from
the fact that liberal education is a process of leading prisoners out
of the Cave in Plato's Allegory at the beginning of Book VII of the
Republic, away from a world of shadows and echoes which they have
for a lifetime mistaken for the world of reality. Blinded by the brilliant
sun of truth, these released prisoners feel only confusion at the outset; then they begin to sort out their impressions and, for the first
time, they see real people, witness real events, and hear real voices.
In short, they have found "truth."6
If the Delphic inscription has to do with illusion about the self,
the Allegory of the Cave has to do with illusion about all of the
world outside oneself. Together, the inscription and the allegory do
in fact say something of large significance about the role of the professor and the books he assigns in certain kinds of liberal and general
courses. The truth, holds the scientist, is cold, hard, metallic; whether
4. Plato, Apology.
5. The most influential recent book on alienation is: Kenneth K eniston,
The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society, Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1965.
6. In the Allegory of the Cave, ·Plato pictures the human race as chained
within a cave, facing the rear wall, seeing only shadows and mistaking
them for the world of reality.
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welcome or unwelcome, whether reinforcing earlier beliefs or destroying
them, whether viewed as a valuable guide to ever greater comprehension of self and the world or as a threat to one's world-view and
self-perception, fosterer of hopes or destroyer of dreams, there it is
in all its m ajestic impersonality and objectivity as the na tural and
social scientists h ave discovered it. Isn' t tha t what liberal education
is all about- release from constricting illusions, liberating introduction to the objective world of things as they are? Haven' t men always
pointed to the relationship between "liberal" and the Latin lib erare
( to free or release ) ? Isn't liberal education in large measure a process
of achieving freedom from narrow ethnic, religious, neighborhood,
family, and personal biases, rigid provincialisms, false conceptions,
warped visions- and replacing all this dead wood with newly-planted
vegetation in the fresh air of unfettered inquiry, following " the truth"
( as Socrates advised ) 7 wherever it leads, an openness to new ideas,
a minimum of dogma tism and preconception,8 a willingness to face
the new, or, in the words of Sena tor Fulbright, a resolve to discard
"old myths" for "new realities," a d etermina tion to " think unthinkable
thoughts" ?9 Yes, these goals are almost universally regarded as among
the most significant in the liberal arts in higher education. And the
fi rst major objective of this paper has been to identify clearly this lofty
and essential aim of liberal learning.
Yet before proceeding to other major aims of general education,
one must record a significant reservation or two about freedom from
illusions, or a t least about total freedom from illusions. M axim Gorki's
Lower D epths l0 was written at a time of national poverty, hunger,
and extreme misery on a national scale in Russia a few years prior
to the 1905 Revolution . The characters in the dosshouse, where all
the action occurs, are beggars, thieves, prostitutes, and all manner
of social outcasts-the dregs of society. As they move about fighting,
swearing, ill, dying, a m ysterious elderly stranger makes an unexpected
appearance; la ter he will depart as suddenly and unexpectedly. To
each desperate person the stranger, Luka, offers hope, comfort,
optimism-in a word, illusion, for there really is scant hope for most
of them . One or two may fashion a new and better life from the new
image of themselves a nd of the world which he gives them. An old
woman will die somewha t more peacefully because of the courtesy,
comfort, and compassion he brings her. But in the lives of most there
will be no difference, for the illusions a re-to be blunt-often lies,
as the old man knows and as his audience generally suspects. Yet no
man can be sure, and each listens eagerly to wh at the ancient a nd
7. Plato, Apology.

8. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, Basic Books, 1960.
9. J. W. Fulbright, Old Myths and New Realities, Vintage, 1964.
10. M axim Gorki, L ower D epths, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959.
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almost other-worldly Luka has to say. For each he has words 01
comfort, of hope, of a better tomorrow. And surely all of them are
better human beings because he is, however briefly, among them.
To the alcoholic who insists that he is "done for," Luka says: "Why
done for? You can get yourself cured. They cure drunks nowadays,
I hear. Free of charge, too. There's a special hospital for drunkardsso that they can be treated for nothing. They've found out, you see,
that drunks are human beings, after all , and they're even pleased when
they want to be cured. There's a chance for you. Go there right
away." And again, "A man can do anything if he really wants to."
To the dying Anna, Luka says, "It's all right. You feel like that just
before you die, my dear. It's all right. You keep hoping. You'll die
and then you' ll have peace. Nothing to wish for, nothing to do but
lie down. Death smooths out everything. It's kind to us humans."
A bit later on: "And the Lord will look at you gently and tenderly
and say: ' I know this here Anna. Well,' he'll say, 'lead her to
Paradise. Let her rest. I know she's had a hard life and is tired. Give
Anna some rest.' " Peppel the thief, when advised to leave this
wretched environment and seek a new life in Siberia, where strong
young men are needed, accuses the old man of telling lies. Luka
insists that he is telling the truth, urges Peppel to go see for himself,
and then: "And why do you want the truth so badly? Truth might
come down on you like an axe." And, finally, to the crucial questionDoes God exist?-Luka replies, "If you believe, He exists; if you
don't, He doesn't. Whatever you believe in exists."
Illusion has its roster of defenders. One is a poet of our time,
Samuel Hoffenstein:
Little by little we subtract
Faith and F allacy from Fact,
The illusory from the True,
And starve upon the residue. I I
Another is Doctor Relling in Ibsen's The Wild Duck. When asked
how he is treating a hopeless case, he replies, "I am trying to keep
up the make-believe of life in him"; and "If you take away makebelieve from the average man, you take away his happiness as well."
Consider the contemporary young Russian poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko,
m "Early Illusions":
Early illusions are beautiful,
Early illusions are wounding
But what does it matter! We are above vanity,
We embrace the highest knowledge,
saved by our happy blindness.
11. Samuel Hoffenstein, Year In, You're Out, Garden City, 1930, p. 122.
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We, who are not afraid of taking a false stepfools, from the common point of viewstill keep enchantment in our faces
through all the disillusioned crowd.
You see, it is not the knowledge of the serpent,
it is not the doubtful honor of experience,
but the ability to be enchanted by the world
tha t reveals to us the world as it really is.
Suppose someone with illusions in his eyes
flashes past, pursuing some distant gleam,
then it doesn't seem to us tha t he is blindit seems to us tha t we ourselves are blind.12
Is it intellectually wrong or harmful to step out of a cold, p ainful
world into the nightclub of illusion in the Broadway musical Cabaret? 13 Is Don Quixote ill-served by his illusion that he is a medieval
knight and that the servant girl is his beloved, his Dulcinea?14 Perhaps
each of us requires his own dulcinea. Who is to say ? As a Spanish
poet observed recently in an address to the Harvard faculty, "I h ave
nothing to give you but my perplexities, my doubts." And what is
h ere intended is surely no repudia tion of the ancient and noble professional responsibility to dispel illusion. M any illusions are harmful,
false, or d angerous. But philosophy, religion, art, fiction, t ragedy,
poetry are often worlds of illusion.14a Whatever illusion m ay be, it
cannot be dismissed out of hand. Education properly seeks to destroy
or modify most of them. But h ave we as educators given enough
thought to which illusions are worth destroying or modifying and
which a re worth cherishing-and how this incredibly delicate task is
to be accomplished?
So the Delphic injunction to "Know Thy~elf" and Plato's Allegory
of the Cave give us our first criterion of quality in higher educationto modify or destroy the illusion which inhibits self-development,
which h armfully closes out reality, which dangerously misdirects beh avior and warps a ttitudes, all of which is likely to constitute a vast
collection of excess baggage carried to campus by the student from
a limited and limiting environment. Yet this process of liberation
requires that the capacity for imagination, for creativity, for en joym ent of the a rts, for free associa tion of ideas, for some forms of
12. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, "Early Illusions," Bratsk Stat io n, Praeger, 1966.
13. The master of ceremonies invites us to leave all our troubles outside and
enjoy the Cabaret, where "everything is beautiful."
14. The Broadway musical, "Man of La Mancha," is a moving adaptation of
the Spanish story.
14a. Even the pragmatist in politics nourishes dreams. The late Robert Kennedy often quoted Shaw : "Some men see things as they are and say why.
I dream of things that never were and ask why not.
9

fantasy, and even for some harmless beliefs of self-deception remain
unimpaired . C an we learn to expose illusion while preserving a world
of wonder?15
To Delphi we turn again for a second fundamental criterion of
quality in higher education, a criterion which, like the first, is somewhat paradoxical, relative, and demanding of the most careful discrimination. "Nothing in excess" calls for restraint, moderation, selfdiscipline, control of emotions, the mean ( as Aristotle would la ter
point out ) between extremes.16 Every professor is likely to regard
this Apollonian ideal ( mediocritas aurea ) 17 as a m ajor obj ective of
teaching, and both by what he does and wha t he says he will seek to
lead his students to a life of dispassionate reflection and behavior.
"Nothing in excess" is a comforting and "safe" view. But the disinterested m an m ay too easily become the uninterested ma n ; the man
of reflection may too readily become a victim of indecision and inaction. If Apollonian detachment guards a m an from excess, it may
also pa ralyze his will to act. M any of the greatest achievements of
m an-new religions, new philosophies, new works of a rt, new laws to
protect the weak-were brought to birth by men and women who
worked and fought with passion, self-sacrifice, and even death to
achieve noble ends. However lofty the Apollonian goal of self control,
it remains a body with head a nd no spirit, a vehicle with brakes a nd
no motor if the Apollonian strings lack the Dionysiac percussion.18
It thus becomes p ainfully evident that a sophisticated analysis of
quality in higher education is infinitely more complex than the vapid
platitudes of the commencement pla tform. For the achievement of
excellence transcends well-intended advice and a prescribed set of rules.
The professor must perform with loving care the delicate tasks he
undertakes lest, like a careless surgeon with a n eager scalpel, he cut
away healthy tissue along with that which is diseased. Too often the
young instructor h acks away a t all illusions, ha rmful or helpful, with
a kind of grim enjoyment. And too often the more experienced professor counsels caution, restraint, a nd pa tience while blood flows and
men die. It is strange but apparent tha t "illusion" may on occasion
be more " true" than " reality," that the p assionate action of the
15. " Tell all the Truth but tell it slantsuccess in C ire ui t lies
Too bright for our infirm D elight
The Truth's superb surprise
As Lightning to the Children eased
With explana tion kind
The Truth must dazzle gradually
Or every ma n be blind- "
Emily Dickinson
16. Aristotle, Nico machean Ethics.
17 . Horace, Odes, II, x.
18. Both Friedrich Nietzsche and Ruth Benedict utilize this provocative
dichotomy in the symbolism of the Greek gods.

10

Dionysiac may be more desirable or even more essential than the icy
detachment of the Apollonian. For the conscientious professor these
dilemmas are only too real, and the true course between Scylla and
Charybdis requires a favorable wind, a faithful compass, a wise pilot,
and a sturdy vessel.
The Delphic warning, "Nothing in excess," may well run counter
to a third Greek ideal, the Aristotelian doctrine of full development
of all one's potentialities.19 Although for Aristotle in the fourth century
B.C., it seemed possible and desirable for the "grea t-souled" man20
to achieve complete self-fulfillment, the extraordinary multiplication
of knowledge since then renders such an effort impossible, an act of
"excess" in itself. Today the professor must so plan and teach the
curriculum tha t the individual student will seek to develop fully his
strongest or most promising potentiality while, at the same time, not
neglecting such athletic, musical, artistic, or other talents as he may
have. In this sense alone, can our goal continue to be the familiar one
of the "well-rounded" man. For our well-rounded man of yesterday
is doubtless a myth today, a fictional character in an endless flood
of facts. The late J. Robert Oppenheimer2 l and many other writers
on science have stressed the significance of the rapid growth of
scientific knowledge since the 17th century. These men tell us that
knowledge doubles every ten years ( or less ), that 90% of all scientists
who ever lived are now alive, that the presses of the world disgorge
a million journals a year, that two medical researchers may have
trouble communicating with each other because each is so highly
specialized in different parts of the body. It is clearly no longer
possible for an Aristotle, a Renaissance man, a Francis Bacon to take
all knowledge to be his province.
Scientific knowledge is cumulative,22 and the researcher of today
builds upon a nd adds to the findings of the researcher of yesterday.
Yet, because ours is so scientific and technological a world, we owe
it to our students tha t their undergraduate education, whether they
plan to be scientists or not, include substantial knowledge of the
scientific method, of scientific vocabulary, of science as a form of
aesthetic activity, of science as reflecting a p articular intellectual
posture toward the world-together with whatever scientific facts of
great importance can be most useful to the nonscientist as enlightened
19. Aristotle, Ethics.
20. Ibid . The "great-souled" man strikes the reader as Aristotle 's image
of himself.
J. R obert Oppenheimer, "Science and the Human Community"; in
Charles Fra nkel (ed. ), Issues in University Edu catio n, H arpers, 1959.
22. For the bes t brief description of the difference between cumulative and
non-cumulative knowledge, see Crane Brinton, Ideas and M en, PrenticeHall, 1950, pp. 12, ff. An average high school student today knows more
science than Aristotle b ecause science is cumulative. However, today's
student who seeks to write a play has no a dvantage over Shakespeare.
21.
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citizen and can help him understand the nature of science by way
of illumina ting illustrations. No one need today recapitulate the marvels of open-heart surgery, transplanting of vital organs, miracle drugs,
space travel, the unfolding mysteries of genetics, the dangers and
potentialities of nuclear energy, the electronic and computer transforma tion of familiar life patterns now dead beyond all hope of
resurrection. The story is, though very young, too familiar to bear
frequent repetition. Quality in higher education cannot ignore or
treat casually the facts and methods of science in an age dominated
by science. Neither the girl who "hates science" nor the boy who plans
to major in history should be permitted to evade these minimal
science requirements. And the same, or something similar, must be
said for mathematics and at least elementary statistics. The most
significant goal of all here-as elsewhere in any good education-is
that the student acquire enough knowledge, interest, and motivation
to wish and to be able to pursue the subject independently all through
life.
If a strong preparation in the cumulative sciences is indispensable
to an understanding of the modern world, the non-cumulative subjects
a re equally indispensable to the enrichment of the personal life. Technology and science without philosophy, litera ture, religion, art, a nd
music produce efficiency without purpose, means without ends, space
travel with no significant destina tion, the m arvels and miracles of
the m achine without human meaning. And what is life without
meaning? The empty days and lonely nights of the detached Monsieur
Mersault in Camus' The Stranger? The sheer absurdity to which a
meaningless life is reduced in Th e Myth of Sisyphus? Camus can
live a life without purpose, even contemplate suicide and reject it
in favor of defiance of absurdity. Yet he has Cherea in Caligula
declare: "To lose one's life is no great matter; when the time comes,
I'll have the courage to lose mine. But wha t's intolerable is to see
one's life being d rained of meaning, to be told there's no reason for
existing. A man can't live without some reason for living."23 The
study of the non-cumulative gives to each life what meaning it has.
It is and must be teleological, even when the teleological terminates
in the conviction that the life of man is absurd. To perceive the noncumulative as simply a procession of sounds, colors, and shapes, so
constructed as to underscore the cacophonous, the grotesque, the irra tional, and absurd in the days in which the men of this era pass
their lives is a defensible and even fashionable artistic mode for both
today's artist and his audience. In such creative works lies a commentary-painful, screaming or simply mournful, ugly or simply contorted, absurd or despairing or despising or rejecting-but in any
23. Act II.
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event a commentary all the more eloquent because it cannot be
articulate in familiar or conventional ways. Thus these works, seemingly purposeless, are permeated with purpose; seemingly meaningless,
they a re pervasively m eaningful. To exclude these non-cumulative
artifacts of the present human condition from a liberal education is
to tu rn one's back, close one's ears, shut one's eyes to the overwhelmingly powerful message this age is compelled to reveal: many
of the most influential beliefs of the past a re dead and, being without
heir, they have left us a yawning void, an endless chasm, an infinite
vacuum. In this chaos man crawls, stumbles, grovels. He has yet to
learn to sta nd erect again as a man.
Because the non-cumulative is subjective, it can give no single
response to each who seeks. Rather, each must peer into his own
darkness, and " When it is dark enough, you can see the stars." If for
many men the sta rs fail ever to appear, it may be, as Thoreau said,
because " Most men lead lives of quiet despera tion."24 A liberal
humanistic education must and does seek-though it often fails-to
liberate from despera tion ; to provide the spiritual nourishment that
sustains the soul even as the body grows old unto death. Gaudeamus,
igitur, dum sumus juvenes is a cheerful summons to the joys of the
young. But where is the joy when youth has gone, when we learn the
hard lessons tha t we cannot go home again, that the path not taken
can never be taken, that what might have been can never be, that
the hands of the clock can never be turned back? A liberally educated
man may live with these negatives, and with many more, without
d espair or loss of hope. I remember an old professor of Greek who
lectured from a wheelchair and, his tired eyes closed, a cup of
medicine in his trembling hand, he assured a class of young classical
students tha t they would find comfort in Homer in their old age but
he wondered how much comfort a set of blueprints would bring to
an elderly engineer. A professional bias, no doubt ; yet he spoke out
for the values of the humaniti es during an age that worshipped a t
the alta r of science, and this but a few months before death brought
peace to the Greek a nd Troj an warriors who fought for Helen in
his cultiva ted mind.
Humanistic non-cumulative knowledge and scientific cumulative
knowledge are easily distinguishable. What of the social sciences? The
social scientists like to regard themselves as engaged in cumulative
activity. Unfriendly critics eagerly seek flaws. And the truth is somewhere in between, for the social scientist does employ quantitative
da ta and does engage in controlled experimentation. To this extent,
his work is cumula tive. Yet research designs in the social sciences are
often inadequate, the da ta slippery, the experiments lacking in com24. Walden.
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plete controls, the animal or human subjects rarely wholly predictable
in their responses to iden tical stimuli. Anyone disposed to laugh too
readily a t the sometimes presumptuous claims of the social scientists
must do so with tears in his eyes. For there is, obviously, no joy in
wa rs between na tions, in rats in slums, in urban decay and racial
violence, in water and air pollution, in divorce, insanity, alcoholism,
narcotics addiction, in the wanton destruction of natural resources,
in concentration camps for na tive-born J apanese in World W ar II,
and the reservation as the perm anent habita t of those whose continent this was long before the white intruder arrived and conquered .
Except for certain areas of medicine, m an might easily endure a
thousand-year moratorium on science. But how long can m an endure
if the social sciences fail to find answers for problems which the
natu ral sciences have themselves often created?
Tradition has it, a nd some still hold the view, tha t the solution
to those problems which the natural sciences h ave often inadvertently
created lies in the province of religion. Such an answer no longer
ca rries or deserves to carry conviction. The hard, practical, p ainful,
dangerous problems which science has given us, science must itself
solve or take away. Whether we speak of social or na tural sciences,
we yet speak of a method of formulating hypotheses, gathering objective evidence, analyzing da ta, forming tentative laws, repeating
and replicating until reasonably firm conclusions can be established.
Applied to human problems of scientific origin, the techniques of the
social sciences are now our best hope in m any areas which especially
lend themselves to these a nalytical tools. And thus "common sense"
solutions are discarded for those which have a reasonably firm a nd
hopeful base in the several kinds of evidence with which the social
scientist must deal.
A good education must include a knowledge and understanding of
the methods, the vocabulary, the techniques, the special intellectual
designs a nd operations, the potentialities, limitations, and inconsistencies
involved in all three: the humanities, the social sciences, and the
natu ral sciences- together with essential subject m atter to illustrate
theory and to enlarge understa nding. If beyond this, the student can
be brought to an awareness of critical areas of overlap and interrelationship, if he can perceive the extraordinary complexity of life
tha t precludes the isolation of a single phenomenon within a single
discipline, if he is m ade sensitive to the a reas of guess, mystery, a nd
the unknowable24a in the exact sciences along with the kinds of
"truth" that often emerge with inexorable force from the non-cumula tive---only then will his education have fashioned a mind that is
24a. Today's youth culture often gives expression to these feelings. Joan Baez
sings Dylan's words: "Be not hard, for life is short and nothing is given
to man."
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controlled, disciplined, imagina tive, creative, critical, orderly, playful,
venturesome, all at the same time and all in healthy, vigorous juxtaposition. No man who is concerned about quality in education will
regard these observa tions as constituting anything but an almost
impossibly lofty aim. But no man who cherishes quality in higher
education as among man's dearest possessions will despair of reaching
the cloud-enshrouded peaks of Mt. Olympus with at least his best
students and of pitching camp at a somewhat lower elevation with
those students who prefer the nourishment of bread and wine to that
of ambrosia and nectar.
To teach is an act of faith-faith that one's own contribution,
in conjunction with tha t of his colleagues, will produce a mind that
roams widely and penetrates deeply. Is man free or determined? Let
the theologia n speak of predestination and grace; the scientist, of
heredity and genes; the social scientist, of environment and socialization. And let the huma nist speak in parables and symbols, as Nehru
did when h e said, "Life is like a game of cards. The hand that is
dealt you represents determinism. The way you play it is free will."
And, fin ally, let our most promising students see it all, the bewildering
totality of views, perceptions, insights, revelations, theories, intuitions,
proofs, and faiths-and having seen the global possibilities, let them
select the elements tha t determine ultimately their own W eltanschauung. Thus, too, with m a tters of the soul and the afterlife, the
existence of God, the natural as opposed to the m an-made law, the
rich variety of aesthetic and political and even scientific ideologies, the
endless gamut of human doubts and perplexities and unansweredoften una nswerable- pleas for explanation and justification. In quality
higher education, there are tentative a nswers rather than fixed truths,
possibilities rather than certainties, variable relationships ra ther than
fixed dogmas in the universal search for "meaning" tha t explains
and satisfies.
Thus by indirection we have arrived a t a kind of definition of
general or liberal education: 25 indispensable knowledge, regardless
of one's specialty, of the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the
25. The most famous , but now outdated , book on general education is
General Education in a Free Society: Report of the H arvar d Committee,
Harvard , 1946. A good historical summary is Ru sse ll Thomas, The
Search for a Common L earning: G eneral Educa tio n, 1800-1960, McGrawHill, 1962. Th e Wm. C. Brown Co . has a good se ries of seven or eight
books on gen eral educa tion, each devoted to a different subject. The most
recent book is D a niel Bell, The Reforming of Gen eral Education, Columbia, 1966. Though greeted with some acclaim, the Bell bo ok is overbl own, overwritten, a nd overrated. A reliable brief summary appears in
Jam es G. Rice (ed. ), General Education: Current Id eas and Con cerns,
AHE-NEA, 1964; chapter IX of thi s book, by Edwa rd B. Blackman, is
one of th e rare non-technical articles on evaluation in general educa tion.
The recent revision of the Encyclop edia of Educat io nal R esearc h contains
an exhaustive chapter on general education by Edward B. Blackman.
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humanities; the cumulative and the non-cumulative; the rational,
the emotional, the spiritual, the mystical; fidelity and art; the real
and the fanciful ; the solemn and the sportive; self-discipline a nd
abandonment; the systematic and the chaotic ; the organized and the
anarchic- the whole great range of human knowledge and feeling and
character and action in the broadest horizons above and in the narrowest of crevices below, not mastered to be sure, but richly sampled.
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If we think of a liberal education as one which seeks to provide
human beings with a means for realizing their humanity, we must
recognize immediately that our educational institutions are completely
out of it. It is not just that they aren't doing the job. They are in
another ball park, playing a duller-and dirtier-game.
One of the rules of the game they are playing is that everyone
must pretend that whatever is going on constitutes a liberal education . This doesn' t really fool very many people, but it introduces so
m any irrelevancies into any discussion of the matter that coming to
any kind of conclusion becomes impossible. Since another rule has
it that any change in the rules must be preceded by an exhaustive
discussion of all aspects of the matter, the game goes on and on and
on, in the same form tha t it has for a century or more. In the meantime, some of the more desperate specta tors have begun ripping the
stadium apart.

*

*

*

*

About a century ago John Stuart Mill remarked in his essay On
L iberty that "it really is of importance, not only what men do, but
also what manner of men they are tha t do it" (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1956, p. 72). This simple idea is a compelling one. But the
form in which it is cast is interesting in its own right. There is an
unusual insistence about it, as though Mill felt that the point ought
to be self-evident, but tha t otherwise intelligent people didn't seem
to be grasping it.
I don't know whether or not Mill was addressing academicians, but
they certainly number among those who have failed to grasp the
point ever since. I can add nothing to his remark to make it any more

17

incisive than it is, but as it continues to provide the only foundation
upon which the idea of a liberal education can rest, I will repeat it,
setting it off by itself so that it can glow in all its beautiful, selfcontained insistence:
It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what
manner of men they are that do it.
(Mill, On Liberty, Chapter III)

I suppose it must be added that Mill is not necessarily placing
character abo ve action in importance. He may well- like Aristotleplace it second. Any of us, however, especially if we contemplate the
varied pageant of human affairs in its totality from the dawn of time,
might do the same. Such a perspective inclines one to consider the
nature of the deeds done more important than the character of their
doers. But that is not the point. The point is that-second or notcharacter does matter.
More important, however, is that to a teacher character matters
most- if only because how to do something can be learned from the
operation itself by anyone with a mind to learn it; whereas how to
be up to what one does can only be learned in the company of other
human beings. But we need not settle for an "if only." There is a
more profound reason for the primacy of character in education. It
must come first, as Mill would say, because "it really is of importance." It makes the difference, after all, between a man and a
machine.
Nevertheless, American education has gone in the opposite direction. Higher education, in particular, has applied itself to teaching
doing with a breath-taking zeal, bombarding a seemingly inexhaustible
supply of pre-fabricated and semi-permeable youth with a seemingly
endless variety of facts, techniques, skills and methodologies. The
manner of men that are finally emitted from its cloudy chambers has
been left to what little chance is free to operate in the ever-moretightly structured process ( considerably less than a particle in a cyclotron enjoys).
This is not to say that higher education completely disregards the
manner of men it produces (if a mechanical man is a manner of man ) .
Rather, it is to say that the who in the process of higher education is
determined, by and large, by the process of lower education. Lower
education, for its part, concerns itself with the who only on an a
priori basis: it accepts and reinforces whatever racist, militaristic,
technocratic, snobbish or similarly delinquent attitudes the society at
large feeds to it. Thus, higher education can be seen to be the silent
accessory, after the fact, to the damage the warped values of an
ignorant socity inflicts upon its children in the elementary and secondary schools.
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In short, the apparent disregard with which higher education views
all but the know-how of its students is not genuine. It is the pose
necessary for the deliberate mechanization of the individual. To be
sure, it is not a conscious pose, for higher education is itself mechanized.
But the fact remains that our colleges and universities disregard the
character of their students only out of a deep concern lest character
emerge.
Now, contrary to wha t we might expect, the size of the institution
is not a key factor in the process of mechanization. Many small,
liberal arts colleges further this end as much as the giant multiversities.
They merely go at it the hard way. Whereas the mega-campus can
afford to be somewhat sloppy in its approach, counting on the
anonymity its size induces to do much of the work of dehumanization,
the mini-school must work against the odds, so to speak, and counsel
and guide students into their special slots in the curriculum. The
curriculum then takes over and automatically guides them into their
special slots in society. The amount of "student-teacher contact" is not
really relevant. Contact is no measure of human involvement ; even
an embrace can be mechanical. Contact for w hat purpose is the relevant question, and as long as the curriculum remains sacred, it is
clear tha t human feelings will be profaned by a form of contact which
seeks to isolate rather than to involve.
Any serious discussion of the future of higher education must
begin with the realization that whatever comes in contact with the
curricular concept is almost instantly transformed into an absurdity.
The warping atmosphere of curricular considerations extends into our
very thoughts. The moment we begin to reflect about education, we
are subjected to whimsical limita tions of which we are scarcely
aware, but which are nonetheless devastating to sound thinking. It
is somewhat like stumbling onto a slowly-turning merry-go-round
without realizing it, when stopping to get our bearings in a strange
environment.
For the curriculum is a merry-go-round-a merry-go-round in
time. Not a very merry one, to be sure, but its grimness is no more
paradoxical than its etymological roots in the concept of a racetrack,
for nobody runs. Students don't even move; the scenery moves instead.
The mechanized backdrop wheels slowly by them, performing the
essential function of a racetrack in our society: selecting and ranking
losers.
And just as function follows form, so form follows function in
this dreary round. The business of a curriculum is the fixing of a
status on everyone, a standing (literally, a stasis ) . Whoever or whatever accepts a place in its static environs is thereby shaped to perform
the same task: grading, evaluation, ranking-a bit part, as it were,
in the G.P.A.
19

The notion of a curriculum, consequently, paralyzes thought. It
forces us to think in bits a nd pieces. What part of it should be altered,
we tend to ask ourselves ? Wha t p a rt should this or tha t field of
inquiry play in a modern curriculum?
Modern curriculum! The phrase is an affront to reason. And play !
How can anything play in a curriculum? There is no room for that
sort of nonsense in this work-oriented Roman relic, this nightmare
of the Muses. Joy, zest, laughter, love of learning-need not apply;
sober gravity is the entrance requirement. Everything must accommodate itself to its stern dema nds. Let us look briefly a t wha t a policy
of accommodation has led to in one field, English, sometimes fancifully
regarded as a kind of central pillar of the humanities.
By assuming a servant's role, English has managed to carve herself
out an empire in a vacuum. But she has developed the soul of a servant
as well, the kind of servant that Strindberg or Genet portrays. H er
"service" course in writing, undertaken for the good of the rest of
the curriculum, has swollen her ranks to their present bloa ted proportions. It has also permanently alienated generations of students and
processed her own outlook as thoroughly as it has the incoming
freshmen. At the moment, a rmed with specialists, she stands ready to
extend her efforts into the fi eld of literature. Indeed, she has alread y
made good beginnings, for the average student is coming to loa the
literature nearly as much as he loathes writing.
Now, clearly, it should not be this way. Writing is a unique means
of expression . It is a soul-satisfying act, profoundly related to growth
and life. It is linked, in fact, to the fund amental drive common to all
living things: self-realiza tion. Though not so immediate nor so cha rged
a medium as speech, writing can do what speech cannot. It can extend
our thoughts spa tially and compose them. This functional activity
should not be thwarted-as it has been a nd is- by curricula r or
societal demands.
The same holds true for literature. It should not be a schola rly
pond for watering the horses of instruction. Literature is a n open book.
If nothing else, students should be let alone more, so tha t they can
read without ridiculously considering tha t they are engaging in a
"discipline."
Those who h ave taught writing at the college level are familiar
with the effects instruction in writing at the lower levels has h ad .
Students frankly say they dislike it because they were "never a ny
good a t it." This is not so strange a response to the impersonal and
punitive means by which they were introduced to this ma jor form
of self-expression. One wonders, consequently, what will happen to sex
when it enters the curriculum in the lower g rades. If those responsible
for the teaching of writing are given sufficient authority, we need not
wonder. We may confidently look forwa rd to a technical presenta tion

20

of the subject in such wearisome detail, coupled with such severe testing and grading, tha t vast numbers of future graduates will voluntarily
renounce sexuality, doggedly asserting that they were "never any
good a t it. "
Before it does any more h arm we must abandon the entire concept
of the curriculum. If it ever made any sense, it doesn't a ny longer.
The true role of education is to be the educator of the society in
which it exists. This is its true service to society. It is false to itself
and to society when it abdicates its true role to play lackey to societal
bidding. Yet this is what education has done. It has accepted an a
priori scheme of things from its social environment and sheltered it
from the empirical fac ts tha t would otherwise expose its inadequacies.
In a stable society, possessed of a set of values so intima tely rela ted
to its life tha t they are reflected in its actions, it is both right and
sensible for education to concentra te its m ajor efforts upon the young,
for the young are ignorant of the society in which they must live a nd
which they will come to constitute. It is also possible that in a complex
society this effort might be most effectively carried out by formalizing
the process: setting the young to a course of study which almost automa tically leads them to an understanding of their society and its
values. We do not live, however, in a stable society ; we live in a very
unstable one.
Not only unstable, but sick. In fact, it has been called sick so often
by so m any tha t, like King Lear, it is ready to kill its physician "and
the fee bestow upon the foul disease." We who live in the society
and in its educational system a re not su re tha t we know its actual values.
\/\/e can feel, however, tha t wha tever the values a re, they a re neither
right nor sensible, and although there is room for a good deal of thought
about how education ought to set about ministering to society at this
la te da te, clearly it ought not to be endeavoring to adjust the young
to its morbid culture.
Tha t education continues to conceive of its role in these terms is
a sign of its own psychic illness, the illness it contracted when it chose
not to be true to itself, and which will destroy it unless it chooses
again to be what it ought to be.

*

*

*

*

J a ne Austen neatly expresses an aesthetic standard for architecture
in a thought which flashes into the mind of Emma Woodhouse while
she is viewing Knightley's house:
- It was just wha t it ought to be, and it looked what it was(J ane Austen, Emma, C ambridge: The Riverside
Press, 1957, p . 280 )

In this observation Emma closes the tria ngle of the actual, the ideal
and the image in upon itself until it becomes a point. For her, and
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we may assume for her author, this tendency towa rd identity of "what
is," "what ought to be" and "wha t appears" represents a measure of
fitness in more than houses.
W e, too, m ay see in it more than an aesthetic standa rd. The a pproximation of identity among these three aspects of reality represents
a measure of sanity and health. Indeed , I would suggest that we may
go further and consider it a m easure of what may be called "moral
stability" and apply it to a wide variety of phenomena that a re not
ordina rily considered in a moral light.
For example, it seems applicable to scientific endeavors. J. Bronowski and Bruce M azlish, in Th e W estern Intellectual Tradition (New
York: H arper a nd Row, 1962 ) , h ave sought to present an integrated
account of the intellectual histo ry of Western m an from Leona rdo D a
Vinci to H egel by employing several rather unusual means. One p a rticula rly striking tactic, which amounts to an organizing fea ture of
the book, is to focus throughout upon the interplay of the empirical
and rational methods in both the natu ral and human sciences.
Briefly, the empirical is the method of observation and experiment,
a concern with "what is"; the ra tional is the speculative approach of
reasoning from postulates, a concern with "what ought to be." H ere
is how the authors put the m atter:
On the one hand, the conviction that na ture is lawful h as
stimula ted men to keep a close watch on n atural phenomena, to
observe and to experiment, in order to see in wh at m anner she
repeats herself- to find , p ractically, the p attern of her consistency.
And on the other hand, it has stimulated m en to think behind
the practical pa ttern, to analyze and to reason, in order to find
its simple and rational organization- in order to find intelligible
laws. The combina tion of the empirical and the rational m akes
up the scientific m ethod .
(Bronowski a nd M azlish, Th e W estern Intellectual
Tradition, p. 492 )
The authors go on to point ou t tha t whenever one mode is fostered
a t the expense of the other, the resulting imbalance retards p rogress.
Thus, the one-sided influence of the C a rtesian method of rational
inquiry set French science back for over a century. On the o ther h and ,
England, during nearl y the same period, tended to undervalue rational
inquiry, and a practical bias developed from the unrestrained empirical
approach . Consequently, " the technical achievements of men of the
stamp of J ames W a tt and Benjamin Franklin were too easily detached
from their human and ethical context, and allowed to proliferate
into the smug inhumanity of early industrial society" (p . 493 ) .
It should be clear from even such brief excerpts as these tha t the
authors are avoiding the simple-minded identifica tions tha t one often
hears in discussions of science. Science is not being equa ted with
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emp1nc1sm, for example, nor even with the natural sciences, for that
matter. " What is" and "what ought to be," furthermore, take on
additional significance as it emerges tha t their interaction is of greater
importance than either one sepa rately. The authors' discussion of
M achiavelli is pa rticularly interesting in this regard.
It is interesting to wa tch Bronowski and Mazlish set the stage for
their investigation of M achiavelli. They begin by singling out for
special a ttention Burckhardt's notion that the city-state of the Italian
Renaissance became a work of art (p. 20 ). Later they cite Charles
Singleton's a rticle, "The Perspective of Art" (The Kenyon R eview,
Spring, 1953 ) , to suggest tha t M achiavelli's " amoral" approach m ay
well have stemmed from his removal of political activity from the
medieval category of "doing" and his placing it into the ca tegory of
"m aking," tha t is, into the compa ny of the a rts, where the a rtist was
felt to be free from moral imperatives with respect to wha t he made
(p. 39) .
This notion is intriguing in a complex way. At first sight, it suggests tha t the popula r fear of the "mad scientist" has been misplaced ;
it is the "m ad artist" -in whatever disguise he m ay be wearing-that
we ought to fear. On closer examina tion, however, we are struck by
the inadequate view of morality tha t the medieval attitude to the
a rts implied, for it equa tes morality with "what ought to be," a nd
suggests tha t the artist may deal with his material however he pleases.
It is closer to the truth of the a rtistic act, I think, to say that
the artist, like the scientist, succeeds by achieving the proper interplay
between "what is" a nd "what ought to be": that is, between the
intrinsic properties of his ma terials (the empirical facts of his medium )
and the properties of his embracing concept ( the rational, untested
organization he seeks to impose). This is not to suggest that the artist
must always achieve a quantita tive balance between the two, any more
than the scientist must. It is only to say of art wha t Bronowski and
M azlish say of science : achievement is only realized from the interaction of the two, and bad art, like bad science, results from disregarding either.
It is apparent, is it not, that the thought which Emma Woodhouse
conceived upon looking a t Knightley's house was her own as much
as it was J a ne Austen's. If we insist that J ane Austen could h ave
forced some contradictory notion onto the page a t that point, we
must also concede tha t she would have thereby damaged her own
conception as much as Emma's integrity to herself. By the same means,
we can detect the na ture of M achiavelli's failure . It is what Bronowski
and M azlish are getting at when they ascribe his "profound error"
to the fac t tha t "he did not sufficiently reckon with the moral fac tor
in politics," and say, consequently, that 'his 'science' was faulty"
(p . 40 ) . They a re operating, it appears, from the rela tively sophisticated
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assumption that the scientific method , far from inducing a blindness
to moral considera tions, provides the only m eans of a ttending to what
is morally relevant.
Perhaps the matter will be clearer if we examine it from a slightly
different point of view. M achiavelli, as the authors point out, is
widely identified with introducing the empirical approach into
political study. Just as the artists of his time were, he was concerned
with "wha t to exclude" and chose to exclude morality, or, in the
authors' terms, "wha t should be" in order to focus upon "wh a t is"
(p. 31). Nevertheless, he also attempted to employ the rational approach ( the reason, incidentally, that the authors consider him to be
the first, real political "scientist") and encountered difficulties. H ere
is the account Bronowski and M azlish give of his problems with the
double approach:
M achiavelli's rationalism, however, collided with the empirical
part of his method. His desire to state general rules a nd principles
came into conflict with his attempt to pay a tten tion only to "wha t
was." He thought the facts con firmed his a priori postulates, but
he neither d rew his postulates from the fac ts nor tested the facts
which supposedly tested the postulates. We see this in his use of
Livy. Machiavelli used Livy, constantly, without any real attempt
ever to check his historical "facts"; indeed, M achiavelli simply
used the ancient histories as the "given." Thus he saw, not "wha t
was," but what his postulates told him would be there. His specula tive theory prevented him from looking closely a t the facts, a nd
the erroneous facts made a shaky foundation for his science.
(Bronowski and M azlish, The Western Int ellectual
Tradition, p. 33)
Do we not have here something essentially analogous to the struggle
of an artist to harmonize his concept and his materials as he endeavors
to pioneer a new mode of expression ? M achiavelli's a pproaches "collided" rather than interpenetra ted . Similarly, an artist is accustomed
to experiencing a ja rring sensation when his ideas do not fuse with his
m a terials. In both cases, if there has been a miscalculation, collisions
occurring in the process of composition signal the fact, collisions which,
taken as a whole, are the third point in Emma's triangle: the image.
For the image is no more nor less than the jarring which accompanies
the separation of "wha t is" and "what ought to be" or, put in other
terms, the stresses set up by the failure of the empirical and the
rational to mesh and support each other. And it seems reasonable to
conclude tha t the true artist and the true scientist sha re in the trait
of sensitivity, sensitivity to the collisions between "wha t is" and "what
ought to be" tha t drive the two apart.
Machiavelli's double approach led to a double failure. Both his
empirical a nd his rational methods failed because they failed to
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interact. It was not that Machiavelli was too much the realist (whatever that m ay mean); it was that he was a bad scientist--or artist-it
comes to the same thing. The failure is a moral one in either case:
it is the failure to be sensitive to the environment one seeks to create
or understand- ultimately, a failure of character. It really is of
importance.

*

*

*

*

Emma's triangle provides a measure of the degree to which moral
considerations are being overlooked in the manipulations of an environment, whether that environment is made up of people, things or ideas.
If the triangle is large, something is amiss; if it is small, our approach
is morally sound.
Nevertheless, Emma's vision of Knightley's house as morally sound
was not true to the age in which she lived. It was a dream vision,
true only in the closed, sheltered environment into which her creator
had put her, an environment which was itself a dream of some golden
age in the past. England a t the beginning of the 19th century was
quite a different thing.
·
Leona rdo Da Vinci, who ushered in the modern age, gave us
the enigmatic smile of the Mona Lisa and the anguished cry that
runs through his later notebooks, "Tell me if anything at all was
done ... " (Bronowski and Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition, p . 16 ). Three hundred years later a great deal was being done,
but the Mona Lisa' s smile had become the grin of the Cheshire Cat.
Lewis Carroll's Alice gives us a truer picture of the 19th century
environment than does J ane Austen's Emma. For Alice, as she struggles
through the wonderland of Victorian reality, Emma's triangle h as
stretched to nearly infinite proportions. Everything, herself included,
seems "wrong from beginning to end," as the Caterpillar puts it
(Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, New York: The
Modern Library, 1924, p. 69 ) . Everything is just what it oughtn't to
be and looks to be something else again.
Everything is arbitrary in her environment, and whatever direction
she goes, she encounters madness : "Would you tell me, please," she
asks the Cheshire Cat at one point, "which way I ought go from
here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get," said the Cat.
" I don't much care where-" said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.
"-so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.
" Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk
long enough."
(Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, p. 86)
It is clear that Alice is essentially responsible for the kind of advice
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she receives. She is purposeless, and her environment simply reflects
her own image to her. When she chooses, finally, to be herself, she
sees her environment more accurately and discovers the way out. It
is simply that. Out.
Nineteenth century mathematicians were wandering in a similar
wonderland, the wonderland of the purely rational. They failed to see
that logic has an empirical origin, a priori, as Nathan Court points out
in Mathematics in Fun and in Earnest (New York: The New American
Library, 1961, p. 60), and they gloried in the limitless possibilities
which freedom from all empirical restraint seemed to offer. Starting
with whatever postulates they chose, they could go wherever they
liked-if only they could prove that their postulates were free from
internal contradictions a priori (p. 23 ) .
In the 1930's Kurt Godel and others proved the reverse of this:
a priori knowledge of the internal consistency of one's postulates can
never be attained, a hard pill to swallow. Bronowski, in "The Logic
of the Mind," American Scientist, March, 1966, p. 3), refers to the
several proofs as "unwelcome" and "unpleasant." No doubt they
were, at first, for they amounted to a moral reproof to the free-wheeling
hubris of postulational mathematics. As Nathan Court, quoting Georges
Bouligand, makes clear, there was something essentially wrong about
the whole dream in the first place:
To find within a body of doctrine G a proof that G is consistent
is impossible, for to accept the validity of such a proof is to
concede to a part of G a special privilege: an abusive procedure,
if the coherence of G as a whole is in doubt.
(Court, Mathematics in Fun and in Earnest, p. 50)
The Cheshire Cat, for all his madness, was right: if you go far enough
in any direction-even in the environment of the purely rationalyou will get somewhere, even if it is only out. It is a question ' of
persistency and honesty.
The rational, after all, is an environment, for an environment is
simply what surrounds something, what something is imbedded in.
We are accustomed to think of the empirical as imbedded in the
rational-"what is" cradled in "what ought to be." But as we have
just noticed, the rational arises in some profound way from the
empirical. Perhaps this is the end of the line. Perhaps all that can
finally be said is that if we wish to come to grips with the truth of
nature and ourselves, we can do no more than involve ourselvessensitively-in the complex interaction of these two environments.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to note some wheels within the
wheels. The recent history of mathematics makes clear that the rational
recapitulates within itself the interaction it is engaged in, as a whole,
with the physical world of empirical reality. Heinrich Tietze, in
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Famous Problems of Mathematics (Baltimore: The Graylock Press,
1965, pp. 304-26), devotes considerable attention to distinguishing
the "inner" properties of a surface from those which "imbed" it in
another dimension. Curvature, for example, is an "imbedding property," for it can be detected only by erecting perpendiculars to the
surface, probes, as it were, in to another dimension ( p. 317 ) . The
new dimension, of course, defines a new environment which gives us
a new perspective of the surface: namely, curvature. On the other
hand, measurements may be carried out on the surface itself, "empirical" measurements, as it were, to find out its "inner properties": to
find out what the surface will tell us all by itself about itself.
As Tietze points out, the significant thing is that for every distinct,
two-dimensional surface "there is a curved surface imbedded in threedimensional Euclidean space, on which measurements agree with the
corresponding non-Euclidean formulas" (p. 318). Yet curvature must
not be confused with the measurements conducted entirely on a
surface, for curvature always implies a penetration into a new dimension, a nd it can distinguish certain important features of a surface
which measurements conducted entirely on the surface cannot. Although surface measurements alone, for example, can distinguish a
sphere from a plane, they cannot distinguish a plane from a cone
(p. 321). They are but mad north-northwest.
My point in introducing this highly technical matter is to emphasize
how difficult it sometimes is to observe the crucial distinction between
two, quite different environments. Tietze himself went to the lengths
he did in discussing the subject of "space curvature" because he felt
tha t the inaccura te use of the term "curvature" in that context accounted for the confusion tha t most people experienced with the
concept (p. 305).
Furthermore, I wish to emphasize that wherever one turns he
sees the necessity of considering both the empirical characteristics of
his environment, which define his sta te in one important way, and
the rational concerns, which define it in another important way. To
be rela tively blind to either is to increase the likelihood of inducing
further blindness, and thus to increase the pain that accompanies the
inevitable collision with reality.
Today, ma ny of our environments have become so polluted that
they threaten to become positively lethal. Consequently, we have
begun to notice them and to strike back with a rash of environmental
studies of every environment in sight, whether natural, social or manm ade. W e live, we might almost say, in an environment of environmental studies. Unfortunately, this environment also is susceptible to
pollution. In fact, it m ay already be polluted by the manipula tive
character of m any of the investiga tions. Like Oedipus ( though with
far less excuse), we are failing to take sufficient regard of the fact
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that we may be the pollutant we are seeking to discover and banish.
By ignoring the moral dimension of our actions, we have created
an intellectual environment, which by its artificially stunted nature
can only confirm us further in our delusion-as long as we choose to
remain in it. But we need not remain in it. Signals from other, more
open environments still reach our ears. Even the "hardest" of our
sciences reminds us that science as a whole is not free of value judgments. This long-evident fact is put well by Victor Guillemin in The
Story of Quantum Mechanics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1968, p. 263) :
The uniformities of nature do not lie open for inspection. They
must be framed somehow out of the welter of observed complexities. And this involves value judgments which cannot be
made according to set rules of scientific procedure. Ever since the
scholastic philosopher William of Ockham (1270-1347) proposed
the principle of "Ockham's razor," the shearing away of nonessentials, simplicity has been urged as a criterion in the formation
of concepts and laws. Scientists have preferred certain forms of
laws for other nonscientific reasons: because they are "elegant" or
"beautiful."
(Guillemin, The Story of Quantum Mechanics, p. 263 )
By blinding ourselves to this manifest fact, we have, as a society,
mechanized ourselves to the point of almost complete insensitivity; and
it is this, I believe, which accounts for the popular fear of the machine
"taking over." The fear of a machine possessed of human faculties is
only the inverted fantasy of our own reality. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein ushered in a long line of such fantasies. But we are the Frankenstein monster, for we are machine-like men whose bad dreams are of
manlike machines.
A machine, after all, is simply a system of parts that do not constitute a whole capable of endowing the system with a purpose. Unless
they are imbedded in an environment of human intention, our machines
are senseless, either ridiculous or sinister, depending upon what they
collide with. Similarly, if man withdraws from the moral environment
in which his humanity is embedded, he loses his humanity and becomes
ridiculous and sinister by turns.
Nothing is simultaneously so ridiculous and sinister as the mechanized environment of formal education in which we are all trapped.
Instead of cradling attempts to understand our threatening environments by providing an appropriate moral atmosphere, it mimics the
behavior which it feels society expects of it, and in doing so, deceives
all those it embraces. It is playing a self-important role so that it
can avoid coming in real contact with itself or others.
Both its practice and theory betray it. Its "ideal" in teaching points
as clearly to what is wrong as does what usually goes on in the class28

rooms. The "good teacher is felt to be one who makes learning
exciting, who generates excitement in his students. He is expected
to be perpetually animated and to display enthusiasm over each aspect
of his course. The student, in turn, expects this for his money and
is indignant when he does not get it.
Both the teacher and the student are acting out a lie. Learning
is exciting in itself. It is not served by those who feel it must be
made exciting by an artificial environment.
In its internal workings, higher education has similarly routinized
its activities. It no longer seriously deliberates over educational policy ;
it only goes through the exhausing motions. As Harold Taylor points
out, in Students W ithout Teachers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969,
p. 139 ), an educational policy committee usually operates "without
benefit of either empirical research or philosophical analysis of its
own premises, isolated from the judgments and ideas of informed
students and from the reality of educational needs in the society
outside the university."
The withdrawal from life can go no further.

*

*

*

*

About fifteen years ago Dr. Harold Greenwald undertook a social
and psychological study of call girls. He presented what he discovered
in Th e Call Girl (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958 ). Undoubtedly,
some superficial details of what he found have changed since then.
His basic findings, I suspect, have not. Some seem noteworthy.
The call girl is "the aristocrat of prostitution" (p. 9 ) . She earns
in the neighborhood of $20,000 a year in "the life" or "the racket," as
she refers to her profession. Nevertheless, she is contemptuous of
money- and of sex. The ma jority of the girls interviewed disliked sex,
and h alf were totally frigid (pp. 134-35).
The call girl tends to h ave a confused sense of self and of reality
(p. 114 ) , a nd her relationship with her client is a mechanical one.
Nevertheless, her simulation of sexual passion is excellent, and her
client feels he is getting the " real thing." Were she less mechanized,
she could not pretend so well.
The p retense is not all one-sided, however. There is mutual
self-deceit (pp. 164-74 ) . The central irony in " the trick," as the
call girl refers to the sexual contact (p. 25 ) , is tha t her client is in
a way her mirror-image. Each is often protecting an inadequate
self-image and by so doing, protecting the other's. It is a mutually
destructive relationship.
Most call girls wish to get out of "the life." Few succeed, however.
Nevertheless, a t the core of her being, the call girl wants really to
live. A barrier is the reluctance to face facts:
Beverly, when she interviewed Irene, asked her about the racket,
and Irene answered: " I wouldn't have the vaguest idea, never
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having been in the racket." Beverly then told her: "Irene, let's
face the facts. If you go to a man's hotel room and have sex with
a man for money, if that doesn't make you a whore, please
straighten me out!"
(Greenwald, The Call Girl, p . 104)
Beverly, who had been in the racket for sixteen years, succeeded
in getting out. She faced a fact.
A call girl is a whore.
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The University and Social Change
By

RUDOLF

J.

SIEBERT

1. Challenge and response

Social ch ange m anifests itself as the forma tion of, and the destruction of interhuma n a rrangements. It occurs in all human action
systems-in culture, in social organization, in personality and behavioral organism. And its scientific exploration has always been
difficult. From Confucius to M ao Tse-Tung and from H eraclitus,
Thucydides and Sallust to T. Parsons, K . M erton, H . M arcuse and
C. W. Mills, social change was one of the darkest areas that either
the Eastern, or the Western mind h ad to consider. Today, at the end
of the modern age and a t the beginning of a new post-modern epoch ,
social change rem ains a most dramatic and most difficult challengea challenge which has to be faced. The business community must face
it. The milita ry and political communities must face it. And, the
academic community must face it, not only theoretically and practically
inside of the university as an institution, but in its social and cultural
environments as well. The difficulties of our facing it are aggravated
by the fac t tha t the problem of social change is currently more than
ever before confused by innumerable ideologies and counter-ideologies,
which try to justify the promotion of, or the resistance to, social
change by hopelessly distorting the social reality of which the university
is a pa rt. The end of such ideologies is certainly not yet in sight. To
believe so is simply to indulge in wishful thinking, that is, to cultiva te
illusions . The modern m ythmaker still does his best to becloud what
little cla rity we m ay have achieved by scientific observation a nd
analysis concerning the problem of social change.
Our situa tion is obviously too urgent for us to busy ourselves
merely historically with the problem of social cha nge. The historian
searches for a reality which was the "truth" for others, namely earlier
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generations, but which is no longer the "truth" for us. We must,
instead, learn to respond to the challenge which rapid, continually
accelerating social change poses to our university here and now as
part of our specific social organization a nd culture. Our time may
run out. We may be forced to let social change drift in undesirable
directions on Wednesday, when and if we have failed to analyze,
predict, plan and direct it toward desirable goals on Monday.
But we will, nevertheless, not be able to respond adequately to
the challenge of social change, either inside or outside the university,
without taking into considera tion not only the present situation but
also the past and the future. The wider one's historical horizon
stretches beyond the present into the past and into the futu re, the
less one will panic and the less one will overreact in the face of serious
and intense social change today. In our case, therefore, the best
method seems to be to see the present situation of the university in the
light of the past and the possible future stages in the evolution of
the university in the W est.
So far the university has gone through two stages: a theological
stage and a philosophical stage. We a re at present in the third, the
positive stage. These stages of the evolution of the university constitute different forms of response to the challenges of different epochs
in the development of western civilization. The theological university
responded to the western feudal societis. The philosophical univrsity
responded to the middle-class nation sta te. The positive university
is responding to a transition or incubation period leading to a postmodern epoch of western and world civiliza tion . If we have courage
and imagination enough, and if we hope against all hope, we could
look forward to the development of a new humanistic university.
I am deeply convinced that we can fulfill our missions and
ma nda tes as teachers well only when we stop sometimes to reflect
upon the moment or " kairos" in which we do our work and to see it
in relation to what has happened before our time and to wha t may
happen next.
Almost d aily we are told-and not only by alarmists- tha t our
society is involved in a variety of revolutionary changes: the black
man's revolution, the third industrial revolution, the sexual or erotic
revolution, the educational revolution, the revolution in our communication system. Perhaps I may shock my readers, pa rticula rly the liberal
and radical readers, by the very simple revolutionary statement that
there is not one real revolution going on in our society! According
to the classical definition, revolution means the overturning of an
object, the object in question being, of course, the extant power
structure, the establishment, of a specific society. W e in America,
after all, a re still living in our first republic, a republic crea ted in
the 18th century by an anti-colonialist revolution. And living in
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our first republic is a privilege we share with few people in the
community of western civilization ; it is difficult for modern Frenchmen just to count the republics through which they h ave gone since
the 18th century; the M ay Revolution of 1968 was abortive and therefo re no revolution a t all ; the Germans have a hard time remembering
the numerous constitutions under which they h ave lived in the 20th
century alone. Unbelievable as it may sound, we live- in comparison
to other nations in the East and the West-in a rela tively stable
society. We resist change, for ourselves and for others. We are involved in a wa r of social resista nce against an undesirable form of
social change in Indochina. We h ave behind us a series of interventions
in Cuba, the Dominican R epublic, a nd now in Indonesia, for the
particular purpose of preventing undesirable forms of social change .
. Our drive h as been towa rd restablizing those societies on a more
traditionalistic basis. W e have witnessed a series of political assassinations directed against great, world renowned Americans whose only
mistake was tha t they h ad a dream of a new America which they
wanted to crea te through orderly processes of social change-and even
within the fram ework of the free enterprise system. The general mood
in our society is at this moment-and h as been for some time-highly
conservative. There is no reason for us to get nervous about revolutionary changes which do not happen. In our society we should
worry much more about social resistance than about revolutiona ry
change.
This social resistance is wha t drives m any of our students into
desperation. Their fathers- in younger days-joined liberal and revolutionary groups because they hoped that social change was possible.
The sons now join expressive movements of the most peculia r types
a nd run away into na ture, flower power, or to C anada, to Cuba, to
Sweden, or to Switzerland, or take an LSD trip- not because there
is revolutionary change going on at hom e, but because social resistance
seems so triumphant that they h ave lost all hope that there is any
evolutiona ry potential left in our society. We know they a re wrong.
But when we love our students and seek a key to their behavior, we
must start our search from their desperation concerning the problem
of social resistance; the problem of catalytic gaps in our society, which
cannot be closed because of a fa tal social catalepsy, which often blocks
effective social change. Our students a re not afraid of a catastrophe
which m ay bring out a deep catharsis. They a re deeply disturbed a nd
confused and frightened because of the continual, and always victorious, social resistance in ou r country during the last five years. We
heard the " Sieg H eil" shouted by the students at the riots in Chicago
during the D emocratic Convention of 1968. We know what that
m eans. They wanted to remind the C hicago police-and the countryof the successful reactiona ry revolution in N azi Germany. We know that
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such exclamations express the students' feelings more than they express
a clear analysis of tha t which really happens in our society. These students were more emotional than rational. But their fears are our
challenge, when we meet them tomorrow, next week, and throughout
the academic year.
In this country the academic community is not immedia tely
challenged by revolutionary changes. A second American revolution
would mean a circulation of the elite. Our society would cease to
be dominated by management and would be controlled in the postmodern period, for instance, by intellectuals, that is, scientists and
technocrats- or by labor. But there is not the slightest indication that
social change in this country will take one of those two directions in
the immediate future. We are not even in a pre-revolutionary period
like Brazil is, for instance. M anagement is in control, not in absolute,
but firm control, of the political directorate, of the milita ry establishment, and of other institutions in our society. Should it gain
absolute control and, thus, should the 127 most powerful corporaations
become something like a fourth branch of the government we would
have a fascist totalitarianism. But the chances for even such a reactionary revolution are slight a t this moment--or within the near
future. Were it to possibly happen, as a reaction to further pressures
from the left all around the globe, such a development could have
the most serious consequences for the positive university. It would
probably cease to be a university a t all. That possibility, however, falls
outside of our present consideration. It is most likely tha t we will
muddle through for the near future, management playing its dominant role, but not unchallenged from other forces in society. A
certain amount of pluralism will be preserved, while a t the same time
sufficient stability will be guaranteed by management's powerful
position. Nevertheless, we should not build a smoke screen between us
and social reality by labeling as " revolution" tha t which is not revolution, nor by not labeling a process of social change as " revolution"
when it is one. Indochina, for instance, is in a real revolution-in the
classical sense of the word.
To say that there is no revolution going on in our society does
not mean that we are not undergoing deep social change. There is a n
intense polarization developing in our society both to the ideological
Right and to the ideological Left. If this pola riza tion cannot be
arrested it will lead to more and faster partial social changes. The
accumulation of such changes in family, economy, polity and church
can some day in the future lead to social conditions under which a
social revolution one way or the other, reactionary or progressive,
becomes unavoidable and a historical necessity. We need look to
our national conventions in order to notice an intense polariza tion
to the Right and Left. We will, if we are sensitive enough, experience
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this polariza tion as soon as we enter our classrooms. On the left we
will find the long-haired and the bearded ones and on the right there
will be the crewcuts! In the center there will sit the huge crowd of
the well-balanced and well-synchronized hamburger eaters and future
lawncutters and mortgage payers. Those in the center are the normal
people. They ta ke life as it comes and enjoy it. But it cannot be
denied tha t the center has, in the last 5 years, decreased and the
wings have increased. The difference between the Right and the Left
in our classes, as well as in society, consists, of course, in their differen t a ttitudes towa rd social change. The Right has its ideal refe rence- society in the past, before 1933, when ma nagement was less
cha llenged than it is today. The new Left, directly or indirectly
stim ula ted by the writings of Michail Bakunin, has its ideal reference,
too- society in the future; those on the Left have a dream of an
American society as a free associa tion of men and women on the basis
of the principle of social justice, subsidiarity a nd love and without
fo rm al authority. Such an America h as never existed before. They see
no reason why this American dream should not come true since it
looks to them so right and so beneficial. The further we move to the
Right, the greater becomes the resistance against a ny form of social
change which m ay transcend the sta tus quo or the forms of domination
of the past. The further we move to the Left, the greater becomes the
a ttraction of the New. On the Left a re the people who want the New
to happen h ere a nd now and not somewhere else and la ter. The
deficiency of the Right consists in the fact that it sacrifices the
present a nd the future to the p ast. It is the mista ke of the Left
tha t it wants to sacrifice the past and the present for the future.
O bserve tha t neither of the two sides of the ideological spectrum has
a present. Since the past is not any longer and is "gone with the
wind"-and the futu re is not yet and nobody knows if it will ever
come, each ideological group has really nothing yet or a ny longer.
Society is, therefore, pulled apa rt between two extremes, each of which
is as unlivable as the other. In the meantime, society may neglect to
decide to do- and then to do- what must be done here and now,
the present being the only real reality which is immediately a t h and,
and neither the Right nor the Left being able to bring about the
necessary synthesis between social and cultural continuity and discontinuity. R ecognizing tha t the idealistic university m ade tha t
synthesis only on a very abstract level, it m ay be the task of the
positive university to bring the idealistic synthesis between con tinuity
and discontinuity down to ea rth.
It would be an idealistic illusion to believe tha t it was possible
to keep the university entirely out of this p rocess of polarization
which is going on in our society, or that it was possible to maneuver
the university into the eye of the storm of social cha nge. The positive
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university of today is challenged by the processes of social change,
just as the theological and then the philosophical universities were
before our time. They did not survive because their responses became
inadequate to the challenges and pressures of social and historical
change. It is our task to see to it that the responses of the positive
university will be effective and that it does not become an anachronistic petrifact, but a factor of social evolution at the very front of
social change, between rationality and absurdity. The New Left,
from an organizational point of view, is still weak, ideologically
confused and sociologically heterogeneous. But in the coming years,
the New Left will be better organized and more active on our campuses
than it ever was before. And that will lead to a further hardening of
the Right. This is our challenge and we must respond. Our response
in all academic departments and particularly in the general education
programs must be an imaginative and creative synthesis of continuity
and discontinuity in our specific areas of exploration, so that neither
past, present, nor future is repressed. The past epoch of Western
civilization must be superseded, that is, negated but at . the same time
preserved and elevated also.

2. The theological university
The evolution of the university started with a theological stage.
The theological university of the middle-ages was as much concerned
with the problem of social change as we are today. The professors of
the theological university knew in principle the same structural
factors and the same causal factors of social change with which we
are familiar : the geographical, biological, demographical, psychological, social and cultural factors. But the theological university
was more concerned with the divine ground and aim, the ethical law
and the meaning, of social and historical change, concerns which
today's value-free positive university does not have. On the other
hand, the theological university knew little about the social units,
the mechanisms and the profile of social change, areas in which the
positive university has made some progress.
Facing the problem of social change, the positive university experiences some difficulties today in combining the academic mandate
and the social mandate of the university. The theological university
was neither a platonic academy nor a secluded pedagogical province.
It was no monastery, no republic of scholars and no ivory tower.
The western university in its first stage of evolution took its academic
function, research and teaching seriously, but it responded actively
at the same time to the functional requirements of the feudal
organization of which it was a part. The theological university was
a very practical institution with purposes useful for the society of
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its day. University in the beginning did not mean "universitas
literaru m." The theological university seldom had all the classical
faculties. University meant simply the community of professors and
students who had organized themselves to pursue their common interests in certain fields of studies. Those studies had to a large extent
the purpose of preparing the students for their different roles in the
social organization. There was room for " paper technology" in the
theological university despite the fact that it was direct opposite
to a mere aggregate of technical schools or a technical school like the
Soviet University for "fish utiliza tion."
In the theological university the different sciences and faculties,
teachers and students, research and teaching, academic and social
m andate, reason and freedom, were integrated by a religious faith. The
professor of the theological university was the carrier of an almost
unchallenged, priestly- not prophetic-wisdom. He was the personifica tion of a total style of life. He was the master. The student was
simply an object of his teaching process. Some aspects of these types
were preserved as the theological university evolved into the philosophical university; the professor still taught in cap and gown, from
a high professorial podium, between two burning candles and in the
midst of neoclassical architecture, sculptures and pictures. That was
only a hundred ·years ago. The positive university of today has preserved only the cap a nd gown. Everything else flew away in the
storm of social change-and we do not even regret it.
When the feudal system a nd the Christian Church disintegrated,
the theological university lost its social basis and its principle of
integration. It could no longer respond adequately to the processes
of social change-to the destruction of feudalism and to the formation
of the middle class societies of modern time.
The theological university reached its peak when the medieval
society had alread y begun to disintegrate. Often the owls of Minerva
start to fly when the dusk of the evening sets in. The contradictions
of the declining feudal society became visible in the assertion of
freedom for research, by the "art es liberales" against the theologians.
Th Liberal Arts faculty was the seed of a new philosophical stage in
the evolution of the university. As soon as the principle of the
"double truth" had been announced in the framework of the theological
university, the theological stage of the university had in principle
come to a n end, a nd the new philosophical university was conceived
in the womb of the theological university. But it took about 200 years,
from 1600 to 1800, until the last remains of the theological university
were d estroyed . The Worldview based on the Bible was eliminated from
the university only by K ant's decision concerning the "conflict of the
faculties" in 1800. E very later attempt to re-establish the theological
university, for instance in F ascist Spain, failed. Spain tried to restore
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the theological universtiy after the civil wa r. This resto ration was
part of an a ttempt to re-stabilize the Spanish society on a traditionalistic basis. But the renova ted theological university could not
re-christianize Spain from on high, as had been expected. The only
thing the Spanish youth learned in the restored theological u niversity
was tha t it could not adequately respond to the social changes of the
20th century. So the Spanish academic youth became atheistic. Then
the " opus dei movement," which had begun to revitalize the theological
university, tried- since it could not save the Spanish youth- to save
a t least itself and retired into the medieval " Estudio General de
Na varra." Social and historical cha nge does not move in cycles, but
in a linear fashion. No return is possible in the 20th century either
to a theological or a philosophical university. Those stages have been
closed forever. The way can only lead ahead.

3. Th e philosophical university
Just as the theological university had been a response to the
feudal society, the philosophical university evolved as a response to
the challenges of the middle class society, p articularly after the
French revolution. The specific characteristic of the philosophical
university was its autonomy, both external and internal. The external
autonomy, the freedom in form and structure of the university, was
neither a gift from the church nor from the state. The external
autonomy of the philosophical, or idealistic university was the result
of the struggle of professors and students. The rectors h ad juridical
power over professors and students independent from the sta te. The
professors of the different faculties elected their deans. R ectors,
Deans, a nd Professors together regulated all details concerning the
students' imma triculation and exma triculation, their caps, gowns,
titles, examinations, the buildings, the behavior of caretakers and
secretaries. Professors and students also had to fight for the inner
autonomy of the university, wha t today we call "academic freedom."
In the philosophical university, this freedom meant the intellectual
independence of professors and students. This intellectual independence
was based on the unity of reason and freedom, of research a nd
teaching, of the academic and social m andate of the university. This
unity was no longer based on a religious faith, but on the power of
creative, imaginative reason. It is also obvious that the way today's
positive university responds to the processes of social change will
depend on its ability to integrate a new reason and freedom, the
differen t departments, the professors, the students a nd the administration, the functions of research and teaching, the academic and the
social manda tes of the university. Our weakness consists in the fact
tha t we have not yet found a n adequate principle to replace the
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philosophical faith in reason, which was characteristic of the idealistic
university up to the first decades of this century. It is certainly not
absurd to try to learn from the philosophical university concerning
this point, a t least until we are able to produce out of the positive
university a new integrative principle. Sometimes it is prudent to
take one step backwa rds in order to be able to go two steps ahead.
That is pa rt of the synthesis of historical continuity and discontinuity.
Absolute cultural discontinuity from the idealistic university is for
the positive university as impossible as absolute continuity with it.
The idealistic university defined its academic m anda te as an
a ttempt to search for truth in the community of researchers and
students, without interference from church or sta te. The idealistic
university demanded and got from state and society the freedom to
teach the truth independent of the wishes and pressures of any interest
or power groups in society. The philosophical university believed
itself to be the historical rea lization of an eternal idea which was
international, even worldwide, and opposed to any kind of intellectual
provincialism. The idealistic university saw itself as a school unir:iue
in character. It was no longer a school in which students should be
instructed as mere objects of education, as in the theological university. Now the student was supposed to participate actively in his
professor's research a nd thereby acquire a scientific education a nd
culture which would shape and determine the rest of his life . The
freedom to learn corresponded to the freedom to teach . The students
were considered to be independent, responsible thinkers who could
follow critically the research and the teachings of the professors. The
idealistic university saw itself as the place where sta te and society
allowed the spirit of the time, the world- and self-consciousness of the
nation, to unfold itself fully. H ere professors and students came
together as people with only one vocation- to search for and to grasp
the truth . The emph asis of the educational process shifted from the
teacher only, to his rela tionship with the student. In today's positive
university, the emphasis would move further, to the person of the
student. The concept of the unity of research and teaching was a
unique achievement of the idealistic university. The principle of
"publish or perish" is a carica ture of this unity. This unity of research
and teaching was a general Europea n accomplishment. But it found
its clea rest expression in the Humboldtreform which was prepared
in Gottingen and then institutionalized in Berlin. The 1810 Berlin
model of the philosophical, id ealistic, huma nistic university was diffu sed to England by Cardinal Newman, to Russia by N. I. Pirogow,
and to the United Sta tes by Abraham Flexner. Edward Everett, later
president of H arvard, was the first American to receive his doctorate
from the University of Gottingen, although Bancroft, Tickner, Cogwell,
Longfellow, and Moteley-a co-student of Bismarck-had studied
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in Gi:ittingen. Together with these men Everett introduced the
elements of the idealistic university into H arvard ( 1846-1849 ) : academic freedom, the seminar, the doctorate, the differentiation of
faculties . Charles William Eliot ( 1869-1909) brought another element
of the humanistic university to H a rvard: the student's freedom to
choose the subject matter he wanted to study. From Harvard the
idea of the philosophical university spread to Johns Hopkins in
Baltimore ( 1889 ) and to Chicago University ( 1891).
We must, of course, not romanticize this stage in the evolution
of the university. It is true that its highest value was freedom ; not
only economic freedom as our business community understands it- but
freedom as to unity with oneself in the other, a nd freedom as absence
of social estrangement. But it is obvious that the idealistic university
was only too often abused by the conservative, and by even the
reactionary, forces of the Prussian as well as other states. The la ter
materialistic revolt against the idealistic university and against idealism
in general was a consequence of the conservative role which the idealistic university played only too often in the middle class society.
The main criticism against the idealistic university today is
directed against its social isolation. The idealistic university overemphasized the academic function and did not pay sufficient attention
to the university's social mandate. It was too far removed from the
processes of empirical social change. It is said today that the
idealistic university developed the physical, intellectual, and moral
freedom of a specific type of historical m an only, the m an of the
middle classes. It is exactly because of this onesidedness tha t the
idealistic university is said to be unable now, during the decline of
the middle class, to produce a new man, a ma n able to withstand the
pressure of social change in a transition period and give direction to
social change in a responsible way. The idealistic university is
criticized because it seemed to be unable to respond adequately to a
post-middle class age. This criticism is a death sentence to the middle
class as well as to its university. The students of the New Left at
Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Chicago and elsewhere, propagating
Bakunin's anti-authoritarian socialism, seem to have the ambition to
execute this sentence.
Like the theological university, the philosophical university disintegrated only slowly. Today it is hard even to imagine how students
felt who listened to a Schelling and a Hegel. But we know that the
atmosphere of the philosophical university was already very different
when Liebig and Helmholtz taught. Their students were still industrious
scholars. But there was already a world of difference between them
a nd the students of the great idealists from K ant to H egel. Around
1900, the voices announcing the decay of the philosophical university
became louder. But there were still Mommsen and Dilthey. From a
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later perspective, the 90's of the last century even appeared as the
"golden age" of the philosophical university. And as late as the 20's
of this century we still h ad such a great professor, researcher and teacher as M ax W eber, one of the fathers of our sociological functionalism
and its theory of social change. But when Weber traveled through Chicago on his way to St. Louis in 1900 and saw the huge industries and
the tremendous waste of human lives in Chicago's slums and the small
houses of the professors, he knew that the humanistic age had passed
away and with it the philosophical university. In 1906 he wrotestimula ted by the Russian revolution of tha t year-tha t world history
was now moving from central Europe to the prairies of America and
Russia, as a thousand years ago it had shifted from the Mediterranean
to the North Sea. H e thought tha t the monotony of those prairies were
conducive to a social uniformity which was not very much in favor
of the spirit of humanism and the philosophical university.
Until recently ( 1968 ) all the G erman student had to look up to
in the traditional German university was K a rl J aspers. And J aspers
was humble enough to know tha t he could not stand up to his grea t
predecessors in the philosophical university. The best of what Jaspers
had to say had all been said when the philosophical university was
a t its peak- before 1831, the year Hegel died in Berlin of cholera.
Our American students have Galbraith, at least, who combines a
humanistic with a scientific perspective. The students of the New
Left speak like H. M arcuse and act according to C. W. Mills, both
of whom combined humanistic and scientific elements in their writings.
But the voices of the last professors of the old humanistic university
or maybe the first professors of the new huma nistic university of the
future have become or still a re very weak. J asper's "world philosophy,"
Whitehead's " wordloyalty," Spranger's "worldconscience" have an
awfull y ha rd time making themselves heard and understood in contemporary society.
One cannot a rgue tha t the idealistic university was not concerned
with the problems of social change. One might even say that the
philosophical university worked harder on the problem of social
change than the theological university ever did, and harder than the
positive university has done so far. It could also be said that the
idealistic university invented " history" and, therefore, social change
also, which is nothing other than saying that history is a dynamic
system of cultural, social, psychological, biological and geographical
correlations. In his philosophy of history H egel, following Herder,
synthesized everything tha t h ad ever been said in east or west about
the problem of social change. The philosophical university was not
only just as concerned with the divine and human origin and goal of
social and historical change as the theological university was, but it
prepared us also for the positive university's work in the area of
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human action systems as the m aterial of social change and of the
causal factors and the course-profile of social evolution as well. The
greater the decline of the philosophical university, the more its philosophies of social and historical change were perverted into right a nd
left wing ideologies. Through the whole 19th century, p rofessors of
small caliber, ex-professors and pseudo-professors sat particula rly on
H egel's posterior and shouted proudly to the world that they had
found a new " Welta nschauung"-either more to the Left or more
to the Right- and tha t the world h ad never looked so beautiful as
it did now from their new perspective. This ideological M ardi gras
went on until in this century the H egelian right and the H egelian
left m et in bloody ba ttle in Stalingrad, in Algeria, in Korea, in Indochina. The philosop hical university cannot be held immedia tely
responsible for this development of progressive and regressive ideologies
and the consequent interna tional conflicts. This unfortunate development was rather the result of wha t today's functionalists would call
a latent disfunction of the philosophical university's activities. But
the ba ttles of the 20th century have something to do with the
evolution of the philosophical university. They should remind us of
the tremendous responsibility we, as members of the positive university,
may have for the social changes of the future. It is, therefore, time
for the positive university to develop a methodology of historical
initia tive, through the cooperation of all academic dep artments, so
that we may be in better control of the social consequences of our
work than the professors of the philosophical university were of theirs.
4. The positive university
We a re now prepa red to close the circle of our reflection on the
university's evolution and to return from the theological a nd philosophical ages, to our epoch of positivity. We can now better determine
how the positive uinversity will h ave to respond to social change
when it wants to weather the storm of the second half of this century.
The positive university will take the social m anda te of the university seriously. Professo rs a nd students alike will be politically
engaged ; probably never befo re in American history did so many
professors run for low, high and even the highest political offices
as in the election year of 1968. The highly indi vidualistic and introverted professor of the philosophical university was inclined to leave
politics to inferior creatures. The professor and the student of the
positive university know tha t their university and their society will
not survive humanely if the positive university is not deeply concerned
with its social mandate.
The positive university cannot offer to its students or to society
a religious faith or a faith in the power of specula tive reason as the
theological u niversity a nd philosophical university did. Its only basis
of integration is scientific observation a nd understanding, technique
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and method. It can do nothing other than to supply the proper conditions for a rational and critical search for knowledge in all academic
departments. The intellectual virtues which the positive university
can teach are critical rationality, intellectual honesty, consequent a nd
methodical self-criticism, readiness for intellectual cooperation, creative
imagination, critical distance from every type of subject matter,
prejudices and postulates. It can lead the student to intellectual
obj ectivity and impa rtiality. It can produce in him a critical consciousness. The positive university at its best will act as a critical
institution.
The positive university will take the full responsibility for the
social changes produced by its research a nd teaching. Insofar as the
university does research , it has institutionalized social change within
itself. Every teacher who instructs his students differently from the
way his predecessor did, whether by form or content, has thereby
effected social change within the university and beyond tha t m
society. One need not go to Washington in order to m ake history.
The positive university a t its best will hold on to the idea of
autonomy which developed within the idealistic university. Autonomously it will set up its own academic projects, independent from
interest groups in society. But it will do so with full responsibility to
society as a whole. The positive university knows itself as a creation
of society and therefore as the legitima te institution for the realization
of science in society.
The positive university must defend its autonomy, if necessa ry,
even against the state which finances it. Although it should take
seriously the statement of the National Defense Act of 1958, which
points out that it is the purpose of the university to serve the sta te
and the nation and to teach and to be involved in research, the
positive university must try to convince the state and the nation tha t
it can serve both best when it can do its research a nd its teaching in
fullest autonomy. The more a utonomy it has, the more adequa tely will
the university respond to the challenge of social change. There are
certain things which the na tional guard and the police and the FBI
cannot do but which the professor and student together can do for
their sta te and their nation.
The philosophical university tried to produce the metaphysical
man. The positive university will have to develop the "political m an" the word "political" to be understood in the broad sense in which it
was used in all social philosophies between Plato and Hegel. The
political man of the positive university will have to lea rn to live
without illusions. Nothing is more difficult tha n tha t. Even those
great men who fell by the assassins' h ands during these past few years
had certain illusions concerning the social system in which they lived,
the brutal law of social inertia, the fierceness of all resistance to
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social change and the jungle and barbarism which come to the surface
in transition periods wch as ours. The positive university a t its
best will produce a man who has sufficient insight and independence of
thought that he can warn his society of intoxicating ideologies a nd
hypnotizing myths and be able to fortify it against political temptations corning from those ideologies and myths. During our transition
period the student of the positive university will often be angry a nd
in revolt. But the humanization process cannot progress without
anger-anger directed against the barriers which try to stop or delay
it. The positive university will have to transform the forces of revolt
into energies of reason, a reason which does not bend to a sterile
conformism or to abstract utopias. The positive university reflects
none of the objective salvation history typical of the theological
university, nor of the metaphysical models of social change typical
of the philosophical university, nor of demonic powers of a necessary
world historical dialectics. But a t its best, it may know about the
intellectual and moral power of the individual man as a real factorthe "subjective factor"-in social change striving toward the realization
of a humane social existence.
The new political man will not stop to ask for the legitimization
of all types of power. The positive university should produce a man
who is able to practice power-cri tique. Without such power-critique
man would have got stuck a long time ago in the morality of relative
customs and the authority of tradition. In the epoch of the theological
university power-critique was punished by dea th. It was considered
to be a crime against what was eternally valid and, therefore, RIGHT,
a priori. With the arrival of democracy, power-critique was institutionalized. It is the specific characteristic of a functioning democracy
that it does not need illusion in order to be the ideal social order. It is
a changeable order based on the "imperfect perfectibility" of man.
A great society can certainly not be built on skepticism. But a society
without an element of skeptical, and critical, consciousness would
be like hell on earth. Too often pure idealism has served to justify
the most horrible abuse of power.
The positive university will be a democratic institution which
corresponds to the age of democracy. The positive university will know
that m an can only be in possession of himself--one with himself in
the others and thereby a t peace with himself and free-when he does
not establish power taboos which separate him from himself and
keep him in estrangement. The new m an of the positive university
will know his own historical situation to be the result of the work of
all generations of mankind. He will therefore let man's work be
man's work and let m yth be m yth. He will not capitulate or collapse,
either intellectually or morally, before the deification of social and
historical change itself or before the charisma of the great leader or
the strong man, whom democracies usually call in when social change
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becomes too fast, too chaotic, and too confusing. He will not indulge
in masochistic submission under party power. He will know that all
world history is only human-and all too human. The student of the
positive university will learn tha t whoever attacked the. relative morality
of the past was always first seen as a bad man; and then, if in the next
epoch people were not able to restore the old morality, they simply
made the bad man into a good m an. The non-conformist of today is
the conformist of tomorrow. The story of social change is almost
exclusively a report about yesterday's bad agent of social change who
has become the good man today. Social security, medicare, birth
control were "un-American" yesterday, but are "America n" today.
The guaranteed a nnual income for the worker (why not for the
student? ) is still un-American today, but will be American tomorrow.
Those who weep today will laugh tomorrow. The Sermon on the
Mount is still a much better and more revolutionary theory of social
change than the communist m anifesto and deserves, therefore, more
than the m anifesto does, to be incorporated into the new humanism
of the positive university, should it ever become a reality. The student
will learn in the positive university tha t not only power, but also
power-critique-as well as the absence of such critique-produces
social and historical change. To know that seems to be more important
than the knowledge of all the tricks of social engineering.
As the theological and the philosophical universities did, so will
the positive university have to produce an integrated model of social
change tha t can serve modern man as a compass for finding his way
in time, as Augustine's model of social change, for instance, showed
medieval m an his way in history. The positive university must become
much more "positive" before we c.:tn think of a new integration of the
positive sciences, a new humanism, or a new ontology. And if such a
humanism or ontology or integration should ever come about, it will
rem ain in closest contact with the positive sciences out of which it
will h ave developed. It will not constitute a metaphysical dome
high above the individual sciences and out of contact with them, as
often was the case in the philosophical university. Cross-disciplinary
general education programs may help to bring about such a synthesis of
the sciences in a new humanism. But for now we can only hope that
each science or each depa rtment of the positive university will learn
all there is to learn about the individual factors of social change;
geography a bout the geographical factor, biology about the biological
factor, psychology about the psychological factor, sociology about the
social factor, and anthropology about the cultural factor; and tha t the
student, in turn, will learn about the inner potential of all those
factors. H e will learn to think scientifically, that is, rationally,
about such variables of social change. He will find a hierarchical
order in those factors which must be theoretically and practically
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observed in order that social change does not lead into individual
and collective catastrophies. If the student puts the lower factorsfor instance, the geographical and biological factors-above the
social and cultural factors and produces a "blood and soil theory" of
social a nd historical change, then he has already ta ken the first step
towa rd his personal ruin and the disaster of the n ation to which he
belongs. To be sure, the purpose of the university is intellectual
rather than moral. But intellectual achievements have moral presuppositions as well as moral consequences.
Nothing will bring the different depa rtments of the positive
university to a better and faster insight into their own limita tions
than a confronta tion with the problem of social change a nd with
attempts to assault the all-but-impregnable arcanum that contains the
secret of history. But to have noticed the limit means tha t the limit
has been overstepped already. The limit has been transcended as soon
as the positive sciences see their deficiencies and close themselves
together in order to produce an integrated model of social change.
As soon as tha t happens the door will be open to the new humanism
of the future.
The positive university, at least up till then, will h ave been a
ha rd school, because the coming generation always wants to find the
one master-key which opens a t once all the doors to the processes of
social a nd historical change, while the positive university will offer
only many little keys which can open m any little doors to various
aspects of social change but not the door to the arcanum of social
evolution. Nevertheless some day in the future the positive university
may be able to bind all the little keys together and thus be able to
open bigger doors to the inner logic of social and historical change. I
hope we will like what we see then. Until then, the positive university
will teach hard and disciplined work, pa tience, and a hope which
is not merely a sentiment or an affectation but an intellectual quality
which can be taught and must be learned in a transition period, or
incubation period. The positive university will be a h ard school
because by its analytical method it necessa rily destroys the students'
illusion that a social order without contradictions or estrangements
can be planned--or perha ps even realized- in the immediate future .
The various academic departments can teach about social change
without adding elements to their methodology or to their subject
matter which are foreign to them. They need only teach their subject
m atter well, and they teach well about social change. And as they do,
they create implicitly, or even explicitly, an integrated model of social
change and a new humanism.
In this context the cross-disciplinary programs have a great t ask
to fulfill. Since each depa rtment is bound to its own class of factors
of social change, the cross-disciplinary programs can explore the
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interdependence of the different factors of social ch ange which are
studied separately by the positive sciences in the various departments.
We have already substituted departmen tal structure for the former
division of the faculty in the idealistic university because it became
too rigid and h andicapped the further evolution of the positive
university. The general education programs can go a step further.
They can build bridges between the old humanism of the philosophical
university and the new humanism of the future positive u niversity.
They can show how the different factors of social change, discovered
by the positive sciences, can be responsibly combined and re-combined
in the future so that a free human existence may become possible in the
post-modem era, whether it be dominated by management, by labor, or
by the technocrats-or by all three of them. None of the classes
of variables of social change studied by the positive sciences will
a utomatically lead to a free society. They are all ambivalent in rela tion
to this goal. The businessman combines the different factors of production- land, capital, labor, and m anagerial abilities-in order to
produce a commodity. Each man's existence is the result of his own
work. Each man a nd each nation combine and re-combine all classes
of variables of social change in order to compose a n always new
totality of individual or collective existence. The biography of the
individual and the history of a nation are the results of such combina tions. Insofar as the general education programs are still rooted
in the old humanistic university, they will appear to lag somewhat
behind the positive sciences. Insofar as they prepare the new humanism,
they will be the most progressive programs and they will be a symbol
of hope for students, professors, and society. The professor in a
general education program needs courage to leave gaps in his teaching
and, if necessary, to endure his own dilettantism concerning this or
that factor of social change. But nobody in the positive university
is in a better situation to respond to the greatest of all challenges
which social ch ange poses to the positive university than the professor a nd the student in a program of cross-disciplinary general
education, namely the challenge to unite cultural continuity and
discontinuity- the past, the present, and the future- into a new
intellectual synthesis and so to prepare the fourth stage in the
evolution of the university : a positive university which is a t the
same time deeply humanistic and as such the adequate response to
the post-modern epoch of world history.
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The Teacher's Role 1n
Liberal Education
By

JAMES REDFIELD

M an is a very poor sort of animal ; our posture is awkward, our
digestion weak, and our instincts unreliable. Since we have been so
poorly gifted by na ture we must rely upon the great elaboration of
culture. Men must be taught almost everything; to walk, to talk, to
make love. Humanity itself is a cultural product: an untaught m an
is not a man a t all. Therefore, education is not just one among
other problems of the human sphere; rather the problem of human life
is itself the problem of education. When we hea r someone say that
this or that social problem can be solved by education we know that
the writer has not been able to find a solution ; he is saying that if
people were better the problem would not exist. Education is the
process by which people become better than they a re.
If we are to talk of education, therefore, we must m ake some
distinctions, and a distinction can only be m ade according to a principle. Americans a re practical people a nd we usually start our inquiry
on practical principles. We ask: wha t does this or that bit of education
enable man to do? And we find ourselves dividing general educationwhich teaches the skills everyone must have-from specialized education-which teaches particular skills a nd enables m en to find various
slots within the division of labor.
Thus we m ay say that everyone should be able to read, write, and
calcula te; we might go further and say that everyone should be able
to read critically, write elegantly, and calculate with some comprehension of the principles of ma thema tical thought. These skills are
useful in any line of work, or at least in a ny middle-class activity;
therefore at this stage in his education the student does not h ave to
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ask what he will do with his learning. Later the demands of the
market and this or that private sense of vocation will draw different
men into different careers-one becomes a carpenter, another a
philosopher. Here their educations diverge and they learn the skills of
their private mysteries.
These practical principles, however, will never bring us to the
question of liberal education. They are essentially servile; they see
education as a response to the needs of use. Every time we are told
that this or that education reform is desirable because America needs
engineers-or, for that matter, because America needs poets-the
idea of liberal education is in danger. Liberal Education does not
concern itself with the process by which people come to be able to
do what is required of them; liberal education is the process by
which people come to be excellent. Servile education makes a man
useful to other people; liberal education makes him satisfactory to
himself.
Human excellence is various, and so, therefore, is liberal education.
I make a rough division into three types.
In the first place there is education for character-the process by
which men become courageous, self-controlled, truthful, responsive,
responsible, and so on. The family has always been the chief educator
in this line, supported by various quasi-families-schools, churches, and
so on. The primary mode of learning is through imitation; morals, as
we all know, are best taught by example. Some loved and esteemed
figure- preferably a parent-becomes the model. Ethical education is
therefore by nature conservative; through imitation the virtues-and
for that matter the vices-of one generation are, more or less,
recreated in the next.
Secondly there is education for action-or, as we now call it,
socialization. The excellence of a man does not lie simply in acting well,
but also in acting freely, taking part in the human world through
competition and cooperation. The classical prototype of free activity
is political deliberation, which means not only the solution of problems
but also the creation of values through the process of consensus and
dissent, through debate. Such free activity, however, is not limited to
the life of the state; it takes place wherever men are joined on a basis
of quality in a structured group.
Imagine, for instance, a small theatrical society or dining club.
Such a group will have to meet practical problems: pay its bills, and
so on, and its members must treat one another reasonably fairly; such
groups, therefore, require the practical and ethical virtues. But most
of the activity of the group does not fall within the category of the
ethically virtuous or vicious. The members must decide what plays
to put on, what wines to purchase, how to distribute responsibilities
among themselves; most of the answers to such questions are equally
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without the taint of vice. Yet without being moral questions these
are the most urgent questions before the group, for it is in debating
these questions tha t it discovers what sort of group it is, whether the
theater prefers to instruct its audience or to amuse it, whether the
dining club looks on conversation as an adornment to meals or meals
as an adornment to conversation. A man who cannot take effective
part in such controversy is not truly a free man ; therefore the capacity
for action in the community is one of the aims of liberal education.
The primary educator here is the peer-group, and the mode of
learning is participation. Our children a re learning this excellence
from the time they sit down on the floor of the nursery school to
struggle for toys with the other three-year olds. The parents' role--or
the administrators'-can only be to create the setting for the group;
the group must set its own rules if it is to create its own values; and
the group must consist, formally, of equals.
The family and the peer-group are natural enemies; in the same
way education for character and education for action are acrossthe-grain to one another. The family is hierarchical and its t eachings
conservative; the peer-group is equalitarian and its teachings are
radical. The values of the group, being group created, are constantly
in process of recreation, always as it were, contemporary to the group
at tha t moment. Therefore, in the peer-group we feel liberated , "with
it"- in the family, often stifled. On the other hand the peer-group,
because it is essentially competitive, cannot love anyone. If the family
tends to seem old-hat, the peer-group is swept by idle fashions; if
we are to take its enthusiasms seriously we must forget how different
they were a few months ago and how different they will be again in a
few months more. In adolescence we encounter most vividly this conflict of the two standards, we most feel ourselves torn, but the conflict remains a permanent part of our experience, seen, perhaps, in
the conflicting urgencies of the traditional a nd the contemporary, in
the arts; or in politics in the need for authority as against the desirability of wide participation in the decision-making process.
These, then, are two types of liberal education; I promised a
third. This third I associate with the university. The university was
the grea t social invention of the classical period and it has ever since
recrea ted itself by a return to its classical sources; in this sense it is
extremely conservative. Yet the tradition that it exists to conserve is
a radical tradition-secular, skeptical, iconoclastic. The university
thinks of itself as a community of scholars, yet it is organized into an
elaborate hierarchy. The university distrusts authority, distrusts that
which claims to be so simply because it has always claimed to be so;
a t the same time the university distrusts the fashionable, is uneasy
about the contemporary. These paradoxes could be multiplied. They
have something to do, I think, with the fact tha t liberal education in
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a university does not mean education for character nor education for
action; it is not a place where men become decent human beings
nor a place where they become the leaders the na tion requires. Some
third thing goes on among us ; I should like to consider what. I
approach this question indirectly---extremely indirectly- by asking:
what is the role of the teacher in a university education?
One ancient notion is still with us: the notion of the teacher as a
vehicle of learning, a knower to whom the ignorant appeal. In its most
extreme form the teacher may actually be the sole repository of the
text, as in the Indian Vedic schools, where the schola rs transmitted
the Vedas entirely by memory from genera tion to generation. Or if
the text is written the teacher may possess the commentary, as in the
European tradition of classical schola rship, in which much of the lore
of syntactical minutiae and textual variants has been transmitted orally
from scholar to scholar. E ven when the text is written, the teacher
may be a huma n index, able to find in a hundred volumes what, for
example, the Talmud says on this or that point.
The situa tion is much the same when the teacher is the vehicle,
not of fact or theory, but of practical skill. If we go to him for
instruction on how to do this or tha t he is still a vehicle of knowing, a
resource to whom we a ppeal. By this notion the special virtue of the
teacher is the ability to respond to question; he is the man who h as
the answers.
This notion of the teacher is, I think, on the way out; he can be
replaced by a sophisticated informa tion-retrieval system. Soon we
should be able to walk into our libraries and ask the m achine: what
happened at X ; who has written on topic Y ; how do we accomplish
purpose Z? The machine will have all the answers; its print-outs will be
immedia te, accurate, and as good as the questions we put into it.
A second notion is of the teacher as organizer of information, the
man who breaks down the indigestible lumps of knowledge so that
they can be assimilated bit by bit. H ere the teaching machine has a
great future; it is fa r more pa tient than the human drill-master, far
less likely to be distracted by an unattractive personality or a pretty
face . Insofar as educa tion can be reduced to an ordered method of
comprehension and practice it can be effectively mechanized.
A third notion is of the teacher as performer, the m an who m akes
knowledge pala table, even seductive, by the charm of his m anner
and the power of his rhetoric. Here again we await only the perfection
of the media. When the television screen is able to give the student
the sense tha t he is in the actual presence of the teacher, when it h as
been combined with the teaching m achine in such a way as to demand
the attention a nd response of the student, we will be able to immortalize
the great performers of the class room and accumulate their charisma
as a possession for all time, available for immediate recall.
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There is nothing like machinery to clarify a social question. Just
as labor-saving devices have forced us to reflect upon the proper
relation of work and leisu re, so the rise of technology in the classroom
forces us to reflect on the human use of the teacher. We do not face,
I think, much technological unemployment in this generation; the
machinery is too clumsy and too expensive. But it is worth asking:
what can a man do that a machine, even in principle, cannot?
The one thing a machine cannot be is a person ; that is by definition. Therefore we cannot care about machinery as we care about
persons. Nor can a m achine care about us. To use a modish form of
language : the relation between myself and a machine must always
be I-it ; never I-thou.
These days, perhaps because we feel ourselves the victims of ou r
machines, we a re increasingly concerned for the vitality of personal
relations. This concern extends to teaching. In an ea rlier age the
virtue of the teacher lay in knowing, in his command of the subjectm a tter. Today we increasingly value the teacher for caring, for his
commitment to the good of the student. This notion of the teacher's
characteristic excellence began in the progressive elementary schools a t
the turn of the century ; it has gradually seeped up to the colleges. The
famous undergradua te teachers are those who cherish , even love,
their students.
All of us can see the value of this notion of teaching; if a teacher
does not care about his student he has no good reason for teaching him.
If the student does not care about the teacher he is u nlikely to learn
well. E ach of us, I suppose, can remember one or two teachers we
cared about ; these teachers were and are for u s models of aspiration.
In our relations with them we find that we wanted not merely to
know what they knew or to be able to do wha t they could ; we wa nted
also to become what they were. And this aspira tion to become like
the persons we care about is the most important motive for learning;
so it is often said that only by establishing a personal relation with
the student can the teacher motivate the student to learn.
At the same time, most of us are a little bit nervous about this stress
on the personal relation between student and teacher. We are afraid
tha t teaching will suffer if the rela tion becomes quasi-erotic or quasiparental. We do not like teachers who play the Messiah and gather
to themselves disciples ; we distrust the tendency ( in all of us ) to
fla tter the students and so secure their love a nd esteem. The relation
between student and teacher, we think, should not consume their
energies; rather it should liberate energy to the pursuit of learning.
If the relation between student and teacher is erotic it is a kind
of triangle. Student and teacher a re related to one another via their
relation to some third thing, the common object of their study. The
teacher must care about the student, but he m ust also care about
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the subject-ma tter, and if he is to care for the student properly he
must care for the subject-matter even more. Of the student the same
can be said. The subject-matter, being part of the world as it is, has
the opacity and recalcitrance of the world. It presents itself to both
student and teacher as problematic. And this recalcitrance in the
subject matter gives meaning to the relation between student and
teacher. They do not rejoice in one another's company, like lovers ;
rather they submit to the discipline of a common inquiry, as jointly
they attempt to comprehend and to communicate the comprehension
of the partially incomprehensible.
Teaching, therefore, is a complex business; we have to look
several ways a t once. Under the strain of this complexity we have
a tendency to simplify, to reduce the triangle to one of its sides. Either
we reduce it to the relation between teacher and pupil, and look for
good-will and equity, or we reduce it to the rela tion between teacher
and subject-matter, and say that as long as the teacher knows his
stuff he's all right. Or else we reduce it to the relation between
student and subject-matter and d espair of ourselves as teachers ; we
find ourselves saying that some will learn and some won't, and there's
very little we can do about it. But complex situations are not improved
by ignoring their complexity. H ere I want to say something about
one of the most respected styles for approaching the complex teaching
situation: the Socratic.
Socratic teaching is, I think, more talked about than understood;
sometimes I have the impression that people who use the term have
never opened a Platonic dialogue. There is, for example, a widespread
notion tha t because Socrates asks questions he teaches in a permissive
style, that he explores the student's opinions and interests without
imposing his own views. Nothing, of course, could be farther from
the truth. Socrates' questions are all loaded questions and a Socratic
interrogation follows the first rule of forensic cross-examination: never
ask a question to which you do not know the answer. Socratic
teaching is coercive and painful, like being stung, as Meno says, by
a sting-ray.
Secondly, because Socrates talks to one person at a time, there
is a widespread impression that Socratic teaching is shaped by a
concern for the student taught. There is more truth in this idea, but
it is not a simple truth. Certainly Socrates takes no responsibility for
his students; it is Socrates who says, in the Apology:
I have never been anyone's teacher. If someone wanted
to hear me when I was talking and minding my own business I
never begrudged it; ... I offer m yself ... indiscriminately .. .
for questioning, or if some one wants to answer my questions
and so hear what I have to say. And if anyone of those people
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became better or worse, I am not liable to be held to account
for it ...
The Socratic style is impersonal; he will talk to anyone, and he does
not seem to care what results his talk has for the student ; his
concentration is never on the person but on the argument.
On the other hand, Socrates does not have a subject-matter; on
the contrary, he professes himself ignorant. The Socratic style is ironic,
marked by a refusal to explain. As a teacher Socrates seems to have
little going for him; yet he remains for us the teacher par excellence.
Here I wish to examine the Socratic style in some detail, and I
take for my text an early dialogue of Plato: the Lysis. This dialogue is
particularly revealing of Socrates' method because here his interlocutors
are children, without much sophistication and with no developed
position of their own to defend. So the Lysis lacks the element of conflict which we find in most Platonic dialogues ; it is something like
pure teaching, the filling by Socrates of an intellectual void.
The Lysis begins quite casually: Socrates is walking in the suburbs
of Athens when he falls in with some men, one of whom, Hippothales,
invites Socrates to come into a recently-built wrestling-ground and
join the conversation there. There is a good deal of teasing talk in
the street, in the course of which it appears that Hippothales is
head-over-heels in love with one of the boys who frequents the
wrestling-ground, a beautiful child named Lysis. Hippothales is always
praising Lysis and composing songs in his honor. Socrates finds
fault with Hippothales' tactics:
A man who is skilled in matters of love, my friend, does not
praise his beloved before he has captured him . . . The
beautiful, when they are praised and built up, become infected
with pride and vainglory . .. and the more vainglorious they
are, the harder to catch ... What sort of hunstman, do you
think, would rouse his prey and make it harder to capture? ...
If you are prepared to bring me into conversation with him
I might be able to give you a demonstration of the kind of
conversation which will work, rather than the talk and poetry
they say you are using.
Upon entering the wrestling ground, Socrates is introduced to
Lysis and his friend Menexenus, another boy of twelve or thirteen years.
They talk for a moment, and Menexenus goes· off. Socrates begins his
demonstration :
Well now Lysis, I suppose your father and your mother love
you very much?
Certainly.
So they want you to be as happy as you can be?
Oh yes.
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Do you think a man is happy when he is in servitude and
cannot do anything which he wants to do?
I should think not, absolutely.
Now I suppose that if your father and mother love you and
want you to be happy it must absolutely follow that they make
every effort to see that you are happy.
Of course.
So they allow you to do what you want, and they never
restrain you or prevent you from doing what you wish?
Good lord, Socrates, in my case, they prevent me all the time.
What's that you say? They want you to be happy and then
prevent you from doing what you want? Let's take an example.
Suppose you want to drive one of your father's chariots and
take over the reins, in a race, I mean, wouldn't he permit you;
would he prevent you?
There's no question about it; he'd never let me.
Whom does he allow, then?
We have a charioteer at our house who's paid for that.
What's that? They allow one of the servants to do something
they won't let you do, when it comes to horses, and pay him
well?
But what else would they do?
"Do your parents love you?" "Do they let you do what you want?"
"Can anyone be happy when they can't do what they want?" It is
hard to think of any questions more likely to catch in the mind of an
adolescent boy. Socrates begins with the student where he is, with
the questions which concern him. On the other hand, the tone is
playful and the concern does not go beyond the surface of the question.
Socrates does not go into the empirical question and ask whether
Lysis' parents really do love him; neither does he explore the moral
question of the relation between happiness and liberty. He does not
act as either therapist or pastoral counsellor. Instead he gives the
argument a twist. After several more examples of how Lysis' parents
restrict and hamper him Socrates asks:
But why is it that they hinder you so dreadfully from being
happy and doing what you want, and keep you all day in
servitude to someone and, in brief, doing almost nothing you
wish-so that apparently, you have all this money and it's of
no use to you; nor is your body, fine as it is, but someone is
always shepherding you around and looking after you ...
I'm not yet of age, Socrates.
That cannot be the explanation, son of Democritus, since
here is a case where, I would guess, your father and your mother
give you liberty and do not wait for you to come of age. When
they want to be read to or for someone to write at their
dictation you are the first person in the house they ask. Isn't
that so?
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Yes.
And in this case you can write whichever letter you want
first and whichever second. And you h ave the same liberty in
reading. And when you pick up the lyre, your father and mother
don't hinder you from tuning and untuning any string you
want, and from strumming a nd striking with the plectrum.
Or do they hinder you?
No they don't.
Now just why would it be, Lysis for wha t reason do they
allow you liberty here, whereas in those other cases they
prevent you?
Well I suppose because I know how to do these things, but
these other things I don't.
Ah, excellent, my friend .
Socrates h as proposed to Lysis a problem, and h as put him into a
position to come up with an answer: we have liberty to do wha t we
know how to do. Since they have agreed ea rlier tha t liberty is a
necessary condition of happiness, the solution to Lysis' problem leads
directly to one of the basic Socratic paradoxes: That knowledge is
h appiness. It seems that the dialogue is about to become serious.
Socrates, however, does not take this turn. He goes straight back
to Lysis' situa tion:
So it turns out that your father isn't waiting for you to be of
age in order to turn everything over to you, but on the d ay
when he thinks you have more sense than he has he will turn
over to you himself and his property.
I suppose so.
Well then. In your neighbor's case, does not the sa me
principle apply . .. Don't you think h e will turn his property
over to you for management of property that he has, or will h e
look after it himself?
I guess he'll turn it over to me.
W ell, a nd the Athenians, don' t you think they'll turn their
affairs over when they notice you have sense enough?
I do .
. . . What about the Great King? Will he allow his eldest
son, to whom the rule of Asia belongs, to throw what he wa nts
into the pot when he is making a stew, or if we come by and
demonstrate that we know more about stew-cooking than his
son?
He will allow us, obviously.
What if his son has sick eyes, will he allow him to touch his
own eyes if he thinks he has no medical knowledge, or will he
prevent him?
He will prevent him.
But if he thinks we h ave medical knowledge, even if we
want to hold his eyes open and throw in ashes, he will not
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prevent us because he will think we know best.
That's true.
That's the way it is, Lysis. In those matters where we h ave
become sensible, everyone will turn them over to us, Greeks
and barbarians, men and women, and we will do in those cases
whatever we want . .. we will be free and rulers over others,
and those things will be ours- for we will get the good of
them-but in cases where we are not intelligent, no one will
allow us to do what we think best in these cases, but they will
prevent us insofar as they are able, not only strangers, but
even our fathers and mothers and if there is anyone closer to
us tha n this ; in those cases we will be subject to others and
our property will not be our own- for we will get no good of
it. Do you agree with that position?
I agree.
And I .. . (says Socrates glancing toward Hippothales ) ...
and I was about to say: Tha t is the way, Hippothales, to
converse with your beloved, humbling and abasing him ; not
in your style, glorifying him and giving him an inflated idea
of himself ...
Wha t happens to Lysis in the course of this a rgument? He
is presented with a rea l problem, encouraged to reach a sketch
of a solution, and then that solution is reduced to absurdity.
H e has been humbled, lowered, subjected to Socrates. Socrates
does this with so much elegance and charm, however, that
Lysis does not become angry. On the contrary: Socrates
accomplished the seduction of Lysis.
At that point Menexenus came back and sa t down by Lysis
.. . Lysis, very childishly and affectionately, in a voice Menexenus could not hear whispered to me:
Socrates, wha t you were saying to me, say that to Menexenus
as well.
And I said: you will say it to him, Lysis; for you paid close
attention.
Yes indeed, he said.
Try to remember the whole as best you can, so that you can
say it clearly. If you forget any of it, ask me again the very
first time we meet.
I will, Socrates, I'll be sure to, no question. But say something else to him, so I can hear it, until it's time to go away.
Well, that's what we'll do, I said, since you tell me to. But
be ready to come to my help, if Menexenus tries to refute me.
Don't you know what an arguer he is?
Oh yes indeed I certainly do. That's why I want you to
converse with him.
So as to m ake me a laughing stock?
No, Indeed , but so that you can be hard on him.
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Socrates' first argument with Lysis is based on a paradox: that people
will allow us to do what we know how to do. This paradox is developed by a trick familiar to Socrates : the technical expert is taken
as the p aradigma tic knower, and the liberty extended to the technical
expert in the exercise of his mystery is made the p aradigm of liberty.
Because Lysis does not recognize Socrates' jump from the special case
to the general application he is led into absurdities.
The process a ttracts Lysis to Socrates because in the course of it
Socra tes exercises power over Lysis. Socrates, who claims to know
nothing about anything (except love ), knows how to dominate others
in a rgument, and also knows tha t such dominion is attractive. Power
is inherently attractive, and is, furth ermore, transferable. Socrates'
paradox can be learned, and used by the lea rner on others. So L ysis
is seduced, not so much by Socra tes, as by Socrates' power of argument; he sees that these arguments are valu able to him and therefeore
he has a motive for lea rning them.
So far Socrates has taught Lysis nothing but sophistry. In the
next conversation- between Socrates and Menexenus- Lysis' education
is carried a stage further.
This argument is impossible to translate, as it is based on the
ambiguity of the Greek work philos. That which is the object of our
affection can be called philos, or dear ; a person who cares for some
object or person can be called philos to it, or devoted ; two persons
rela ted by a bond of mutual good-will are called philoi, or friends. By
playing these three meanings off against one another Socrates h as
no difficulty in showing that no defini tion of philos is adequa te to all
its uses, and tha t any definition will lead us into absurdity when we
apply it to some uses of the word. Socrates concludes to M enexenus:
So what a re we to do if the befrienders a re not friends,
nor are the befriended, nor a re those who are both befriending
and befriended? Are there any others beyond these whom we
m ay call friends to one another ?
God only knows, Socrates; I don't know what to say next.
Well then, M enexenus : were we seeking in quite the wrong
way?
I should think so, Socrates, said Lysis-and a t the moment
of speaking he blushed. I thought the remark had escaped him
against his will, due to the close a ttention he was paying to the
a rgument. For even while he was listening his sta te of mind was
clear.
So then I . . . , delighted with his philosophic temper,
turned toward Lysis and took up the argument ...
Lysis has asked Socrates to turn his sophistries on Menexenus,
so tha t he can enjoy the spectacle of Menexenus' discomforture. But
as Socrates talks Lysis becomes fascinated by the argument-not by
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its effect but by its inherent self-contradiction. He has ceased to be
interested in the persons and has become involved in the logos, the
pattern of discourse. So great is his involvement that when he speaks
and becomes aware of himself as a person, surrounded by other
persons, he blushes. This blush is the mark of Lysis' conversion from
sophistry to philosophy.
The second half of the Lysis is more interesting philosophically
but less germane to our purpose. In it Socrates examines the meaning
of friendship in terms of familiar Socratic commonplaces; same and
other; the good as the useful versus the good as admirabie. Without
the second half the dialogue would be incomplete: the conversion
to philosophy would be pointless if philosophy had no content, and
the Socratic commonplaces are themselves that content. But here I
am not talking about Socrates' philosophy, but about Socrates' approach to the student, and about that enough has been said.
We often find it hard to translate the Socratic style so that it means
something to us in our own situation as teachers. It seems that the
Socratic method may be appropriate for moral or metaphysical controversy, but that it is irrelevant to teachers of history, say, or
languages, or chemistry. I believe the Socratic style can work in
any kind of teaching; I will here try to translate it into terms which
make sense to us where we are.
The translation is difficult because the Socratic dialogue starts,
not from subject-matter but from the teacher. Lysis has not registered
with Socrates for a course on friendship. They simply fall into conversation ; it is up to Socrates to find something for them to talk
about. Our teaching begins from subject-matter; the students come
to us to learn something in particular. Nevertheless we have the same
three problems: we have to begin with the students where they are,
we have to offer them something which is useful to them, and
thirdly we h ave to show them something more. And this "something
more" justifies the whole enterprise.
Beginning with the student where he is does not mean that the
Socratic teacher starts from the student's hang-ups. On the contrary
the process of the Socratic teacher is exactly opposite to that of the
psychotherapist. The psychotherapist starts from the patient's problems
and shows that they make a certain kind of sense-"! can't get on
with my mother and I can't study"-"Perhaps you are trying to
flunk out of school because you think that's what your mother really
wants." The Socratic teacher starts from the student's certainties and
shows them to be problematic-"Do your parents want you to be
happy?" "Of course." "Do they let you do what you want?" Socratic
teaching creates problems where none were before, by showing the
student that he does not know what he thinks he knows.
Take language teaching, for example. The student who under59

takes a foreign language intends to learn to transla te it into English
and this we can teach him- by machine, if we are well equipped .
But translation is problematic, because wha t can be said in one
language cannot exactly be said in another. And since speakers of
all languages live in the same world , the impossibility of saying the
same thing in two languages means that, in a sense, tha t thing cannot
really be said in either. The Socra tic teacher of la nguages uses the teaching of the technique of transla tion as a n occasion for reflecting upon
the impossibility of translation and so for reflection upon the problem of meaning- not as a generic question but as a problem recurring
in a multitude of specific cases.
Or take the case of imagina tive literature. Anyone who has read
it with reasonable attention knows wha t happens in a given scene
of H amlet. H amlet, for example, does something. But it is also true
tha t in production an actor does something, and wha t the actor
does is not wha t H amlet does. And Shakespeare also did something
and what he did is in fac t the scene of H amlet doing something. All
these doi ngs are going on a t the same time, and the relation between
them is problema tic. Tha t is pa rt of the problematic of imi tative
a rt. So wha t the student thought he understood is more complicated
than he thought, and what looked like a fac t is the beginning of a n
inquiry.
Beginning with the student where he is implies a prior diagnostic :
the Socratic teacher must discover wha t the student alread y thinks
he understa nds. Since everyone understands something no special
prepara tion is required of the student. But a great deal is required of
the teacher. H e does not merely follow the student's line of thought
in a non-directive style; he takes hold of the student, in the Pla tonic
metaphor, and turns him a round. H e involves the student in a n
unexpected line of inquiry. Tha t is what the teacher is there for. Thus
it is not enough for the teacher to know the subject as an encyclopedia
knows the subj ect ; the teacher m ust also know the problematic of
the subj ect, and know it with enough particula rity to m ake the subject problematic for the student. Since the pa rticular form which the
problema tic will take in a particula r conversation is unpredictable,
since it arises only in the contact between two intellects a t a pa rticula r
moment, Socratic teaching cannot be carried on by m achine.
By beginning with the student where he is the Socratic teacher
establishes a personal rela tion with the student. By taking the student
in an unexpected direction the Socra tic teacher establishes his superiority to the student; the rela tion between teacher a nd student is a
hierarchical rela tion. The teacher becomes a model for imitation; the
student tries to learn to do what the teacher does, a nd so the student
tries to master the problematic of the subject. Thus, the studen t,
while he is learning something, is a t the same time learning to think
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about that something; he is acqumng knowledge and at the same
time developing an intellectual virtue. And the teacher is something
like a parent.
For learning to take place, however, it is not enough that there
be something to be learned; the student must also want to learn it.
Thus we find ourselves saying that it is not enough for the teacher
to instruct; he must also motivate the student. We motivate students in
various ways. We build around education a system of rewards and
punishments-grades, degrees, honors, probation, expulsion, the promise of employment and the disgrace of failure. These are more or
less effective, but they are external to the process of education itself
and-particularly these days-young people are quite capable of
avoiding our particular sanctions by denying the validity of the whole
system. If they do not wish to be employed and they don't mind
being disgraced we cannot use rewards and punishments to induce
them to become educated.
The personal relation between teacher and student, as I said, may
motivate the student; if the teacher is an attractive person the student
will want his approval, and want to be like him. The danger here
is that the student will become a disciple, that he will merely imitate
his master. Since the imitation is always a reduced version of the
original, generations of discipleship imply a steady decline in quality.
The Socratic teacher observes that the life of the mind is both
personal and social; education is something that happens to a man
and also something that goes on in a group. So the Socratic teacher
puts the students in touch with one another and shows them that their
learning is of use in the life of the group. He encourages the students
to criticize one another's work and to teach one another. Thus the
students become a peer-group, an arena for controversy and cooperation. Thus the student is introduced to the community of scholars,
a community where quickness of mind and subtlety of insight means
power and status, and education, not for its rewards but in itself is
a way to the respect of our neighbors. When education becomes a
mode of action in society it is a way of being alive and its own
institution.
The Socratic teacher, therefore, tries to build a community of
discourse. A group discussion-which is moderated rather than
directed by the instructor-is such a community, sometimes intense,
always evanescent. A seminar to which students contribute formal
papers is a larger version; a whole college can, at certain moments,
become such a community. I myself have some experience of a
staff course taught both by graduate students and by senior faculty;
here the staff has developed into a community of discourse. We are
not, perhaps, as successful as we could be in putting our student in
touch with discourse outside a particular University as the law schools
do, for example, with the Law Review.
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The danger here, of course, is that discourse becomes a game.
degenerates, in Socratic la nguage, from philosophy to sophistry.
Learning which is merely a mode of relating to the peer-group is
frivolous- as learning which merely seeks the approval of our elders
is frivolous. The relation between inquirers, as was said, is not a
personal relation; the persons are related by way of some third thing.
The presence of this third thing makes inquiry serious.
But after this discussion we can no longer think of this third thing
as the subject-matter. Subject-matter is present at every stage ; students
are always learning something, talking about something. The Socratic
style does not concern itself with the object of inquiry but with the
condition of the inquirer; the source of seriousness is some principle
which transcends the personal stance of student and teacher in relation
to the subject-matter at hand.
This third thing is the discipline of inquiry-what Socrates calls
the logos. Of every inquiry there is a discipline, a propriety of discourse,
a logic, grammar, and rhetoric, if I may use the familiar Chicago
triad. A language, for example, is not simply a given phenomenon,
lucid to any sort of question. It is a phenomenon which must be
questioned in a way appropriate to it; we will go wrong, for instance,
if we treat a language as a work of art, as something planned; on the
other hand (since language is a human phenomenon ) we will equally
go wrong if we treat it as an object in nature, like a tree. Nor can
we properly treat Hamlet as a political act or as a work of psychological
theory. What Wayne Booth has said of art applies to all subj ects of
inquiry. Booth says: you can ask any questions about a work of
literature, but you must ask them in the right order. This ordering
of questions is the discipline of our inquiry.
The intellectual disciplines are the special responsibility of the
universities. Culture through its history has constantly created new
disciplines-mathematics, theology, aesthetics, psychoanalysis-and as
these become established they become part of the order of disciplines
which the university includes. Here these cultural forms are maintained, not as dead bodies of data, but in a living tradition of inquiry.
If it were not for the universities, liberal education in the intellectual
disciplines would not exist.
The personal relations between teacher and student, between student and student, give education its vitality and warmth. The disciplines are impersonal, trans-historical, and cool. The right way of
speaking remains the same, whether we like it or not; logic is not
subject to fashions and grammar cannot be remade by political fiat.
Furthermore, the discipline is something we both know and don't
know. Since the discipline constitutes the standard of excellence for
the inquiry it is not encountered in our immediate experience or
inquiry. The discipline stands behind the material activity as the
form to which it aspires.
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The disciplines, because they are impersonal, are the source of
individuality in the intellectual life. The student can go beyond his
master because he finds in his master's work a rough sketch of the
discipline which the master, like the student, is seeking to realize. In
Socratic language the student imitates the master, not in servile
imitation of the master's actual activity, but in constructive imitation of the form of tha t activity. When the student sees through
the master to the discipline he ceases to be trapped in a position of
discipleship and becomes an independent inquirer.
In the same way the discipline, because it transcends the here
and now, liberates us from the constraints of the group. The members
of a community of discourse do not merely seek status within that
community; they also seek, through controversy and cooperation, to
make the discourse of the community adequa te to the discipline. When
the student sees through the community to the discipline he ceases
to be simply a member of the community and becomes one of its
legislators. So no contribution to discourse, no scholarly work or
critical essay, can be truly serious if it takes the existing tradition of
inquiry for granted; every serious work attempts to remake the tradition of inquiry in the image of its own potential excellence.
So the disciplines, just because they are independent of ourselves
and of our situations, enable us to discover ourselves in our situation.
Just as the infant can have no conception of himself until he understands that he occupies a world composed of objects which are not
himself, objects a rranged in an order over which he has no control, so
also the inquirer can have no sense of his own inquiry until he
understands it vis-a-vis an order of inquiry not peculiar to himself
or to his times. That is the special liberation which the universities,
at their best, can offer ; the task of the teacher is to help the student
to look through the here-and-now to the enduring order latent in it.
In so doing he helps the student achieve the particular form of
excellence characteristic of intellectuals. Socrates spoke of this characteristic excellence as self-knowledge; he said that he sought it,
not by private brooding on his passions, but by following, with his
friends, the logos where it led him.
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Llo

How the Younger Generation
Is Being Corrupted
By

HENRY WINTHROP

I have just emerged from an extended reading bout with literature
preoccupied with the characteristics of the younger generation and
dealing with its conflict with the older genera tion . I have by now
devoted countless hours to the reading of works done by, and about
"The Hipsters," "The Beats" and "The New Left." At the same
time I have not neglected to read some of the vast and growing
literature on "The Youth Movement" as well as some of the work
done by some of its members. In order to do justice to an effort to
understand the dissatisfactions which have prompted extremist spokesmen of the younger generation to insist tha t we can have peace in
our time, when the threat to our way of life is a clear and present
danger from our Communist enemies, I have plowed through the
literature of "The Peace M ovement." In particular, I have plowed
through the visionary and the unpa triotic varieties of peace literature,
produced by its younger supporters and by some of the crackpot intellectuals who a re affilia ted with this movement. Nor have I neglected to acquaint m yself with articles tha t deal with the m any prominent enthusiasms of the younger generation- those enthusiasms which
have made them different and brought them to public attention. I am
referring to their twisted passion for m arijuana, LSD and other socalled consciousness-expanding drugs. I h ave wasted innumerable
hours plowing through the radical journals and publica tions edited
by politically unbalanced students, by irresponsible, sex-crazed youngsters, by starry-eyed, young Californians seeking a new religion or
a new form of emotional release and by so-called existentialists who
seek a philosophical justification for their lack of social responsibility.
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The number of hours I have sacrificed in reading the nauseating
poetry and the pointless short stories of avant-garde writers who
mistake obscenity for creativity is beyond belief.
I h ave finally come to the conclusion tha t all this effort has been
a waste of time. But I have, nevertheless, derived one grea t satisfaction
from all of my labors. I have finally discovered the intellectual, and
the cultural, sources of folly which have led to the current degradation
of the younger set. I am now aware of the kind of reading matter
which has produced the twin evils of corruption and intellectual
snobbery, currently so vigorously displayed by extremists of the younger
generation. From all this reading there has emergd for me the
clear recognition of the great value a handbook would possess, which
could bring these corrupting influences to the attention of the still
unaffected young a nd enable them to avoid influences of this type
entirely. I do not have the time, of course, to write such a handbook
though it could be a m ajor intellectual contribution to the guidanceliterature of our time. But I can do the next best thing. I can convey
in this paper a brief synopsis of this cesspool of corruption; and so
doing, I can serve in a small way to help the undergraduate to steer
clear of the baneful intellectual and cultural influences to which he
may be subjected during his four years at college.
By clea nsing the educational and cultural atmosphere of those
poisonous and pernicious intellectual influences which can rob the
undergradua te of a sense of social stability-so vitally needed by us
all-a contribution can be made to a task which is preeminently
worthwhile. If done well it can assist the undergraduate in achieving
a clear, social vision and a capacity for straight thinking. These are
both genuine values of the greatest importance. Those who try to
clear the Augean stables of modern learning of some of the cultural
debris tha t is now to be found in them , are, I think, providing a
service which, in its own way, may be just as important as the services
provided by those who furnish positive, wholesome intellectual influences for the young. For these reasons, then, I propose to discuss
below three of the most iniquitous intellectual and cultural influences
of our time. These a re influences which should be strictly avoided by
our young men and young women, if they seek to achieve a genuine
a nd responsible understanding of contemporary life and of their
potential role in our society. These nefarious influences represent
three pitfalls which, I feel, await the unwa ry undergradua te. I shall
characterize them only briefly but, I think, say just enough to make
it clear why it is so highly undesirable for the young to be exposed to
them. Without further ado, then, I shall begin the task I have set
for myself.

*

*

*

I. Existentialism

*

The first consideration to be recommended to the young 1s to
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warn them to avoid reading anything on existentialism and to shun
existentialist plays and movies like the plague. All existentialist movies
come from either Paris, London or Rome, or from Sweden where, as
you would expect, they allow mixed ba thing in the nude. Iron Curtain
countries have a clearer grasp of what constitutes "existentialism"
and they know only too well tha t existentialist thought represents
merely the latest form of Western, moral decadence. All existentialists
a re intellectually undisciplined and ethically confused a nd, besides,
they a re usually near-sighted. This latter condition probably explains
their jaundiced point of view. All of them think m en a re depravedand women, too, for that ma tter-and that we deceive ourselves all
the time. The sanctity of m arriage and the home is consta ntly
threatened by existentialist doctrines to which the young are exposed
a t grea t peril.
Most existentialists a re lodged-or "trapped" -in English D epa rtments. That is also where most Hipsters and Beats a re to be
found . It is no accident tha t sociologists have found a high correlation between Hipster and Beat behavior, on the one hand, a nd
existentialist ideas and confusions, on the other. English Department offerings should therefore be examined very closely and,
perhaps, only the course, Th e Bible As L iterature, should be retained in the curriculum of tha t god-forsaken depa rtment.
But there a re other a reas, too, in the modern university, which
are subject to the baneful influence of this modern form of corruption . The French Depa rtment is u sually a classic case of infection,
introducing-as it so often does-courses which deal with the wo rks
of perverts like J ean Genet and of a theists and communist fellowtravellers, like J ean Paul Sa rtre. In fac t, Sa rtre is so accustomed to
flagrantly flaunting public morality tha t he h as been living with
Simone de Beau voir for years in sin . The Philosophy Depa rtment
is, also, often a conspicuous sinner in this matter, exposing students,
in so-called courses on existentialism, to the work of neu ro tics,
like Kierkegaard, or ex-Nazis, like H eidegger.
In recent years we have also had to witness the corrupting
entrance of existentialist doct rines into Depa rtments of R eligion ;
gloomy men- unduly influenced by existentialist doctrine-like Tillich ,
who a re unreasonably discontent with the benefits of our society, develop criticisms and doctrines which a re bound to destroy the moral
fibre of the young. V ain men and disbelievers, like Altizer, preach
tha t God is dead . How could they know? Were they present at the
funeral ? Atheism is the veritable d ry-ro t of the spiritual life, and a
body of teachings like those of existentialism are bound to prod uce
a theism a nd a moral breakdown .
The Depa rtment of the Theatre Arts is also a heavy sinner in this
respect, introducing the innocent undergradua te to the corrupting in-
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fluence of dramatists of morally questionable status-thieves, homosexuals, criminals and ex-Communists. It is in this Department that
the grossest of moral deceptions and aesthetic pretensions are practised
upon the young, under the disguise of wha t is called "The Theatre Of
The Absurd."
All in all, one can do a great service for the undergraduate who
seeks a wholesome life within the framework of good citizenship, if
one warns him away from the baneful influence of existentialists and
all their works. Existentialism is one of the worst moral cancers upon
the social fabric of our age and within the cultural a tmosphere of our
time.

II. The Youth Mo vement
M y ad vice to the young is to eschew reading any of the literature
on "The Youth Movement" or any written by any of its followers .
The very title, itself, is suggestive. Members of the various sectors of
this movement live for nothing but pleasure. All they have in their
minds-as well as in other latitudes-is Sex. On the excuse that they
are trying to increase personal awareness and expand consciousness,
they take to drugs-and, occasionally, marina ted herring. They are
splintering the moral fibre of our youth and usually against the grain .
They are refusing to take their place in the American community
a nd thus return something to society for all they have taken from it.
And they are practising a primitive form of communism in which
they share food and women--chiefly the la tter.
M embers of this movement prevent the innocent young from developing powers of concentration, by the kind of leisure-time activities
they encourage and pursue. Among these activities we find the following: hopping around in Discotheques, playing Hindu guitars, screaming and clapping a t poetry and jazz festivals, turning on Wagner ( of
all things! ) full blast, and giving parties round-the-clock. I regret to
have to report that they also wear buttons with obscene messages, in
E ast Village, and the most bizarre clothing in the H aight-Ashbury
section of San F rancisco. Their clothing is unually dishevelled, their
hair unkempt and their faces unwash ed . But this is not surprising,
since they have learned that cleanliness is next to godliness and- being
atheists all-they cannot afford to believe in personal hygiene.
Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly difficult to tell the boys
from the girls among most members of "The Youth Movement." The
only tell-tale sign that is left is the amount of steatopygy which can be
observed. If this sign is insufficient it may prove necessary to ask
Bettina Aptheker to make the indentification. But the basic reason for
discouraging our undergraduates from reading litera ture on "The
Youth Movement" is that any enthusiasm for its activities may prevent
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the young from reaching maturity; and people who fail to m ature
usually wind up as communists, criminals, beachcombers, poets or
even disc jockeys. The risk is just too great.
It is members of "The Youth Movement" who are the chief supporters of what Life magazine h as called "The Other Culture." This
is the world of "Happenings"-a world of utter obscenity and moral
depravity. The only way in which the enormity of the depravity
involved in a "Happening" can be brought home forcefully to the
reader, is to furnish him with some of the "ideas" and activities of
people who produce "Happenings." There is a J apanese group devoted
to this "new art form"-a group known as "The Zero Dimension
Group." The leader of this group, nam ed Kato, explains tha t the
nature of things can be comprehended only by those who can concentrate for two or three years on all that is vulgar. The m embers of
this group submit to a truly monastic regime of contemplation in which
they make certain tha t each waking hour of consciousness is filled
with forbidden thoughts or forbidden deeds. One way by which they
faithfully express their philosophy is to carry around vulgar flash
cards which are consulted on buses and trains.
Still other specialists in "Happenings" will assume the postures
of love, while naked, on top of an office building, while they are
flooded with spotlights from below. Some of these creative souls-in
an effort " to stir the modern audience from its cozy emotional anesthesis"-will submit naked to masochistic whippings in public. There
are still others who will walk or crawl naked in public with lighted
candles protruding from their bottoms. Some of the more venturesome
leaders in the art of the "Happening," specialize in creative vandalism
by hacking pianos to pieces. One variety of these liberators of the
human spirit engage in the blutorgie. This is a psychologically searing
event in which a lamb will be tacked to a white canavs and disemboweled publicly, the blood splattering on the clothes of everyone
present. One School-of-Happiness h as revived the Nazi book-burning
activity, in which, in the name of Art, books are piled high into "Skoob
Towers" a nd burned in public.
If the reader is not as yet nauseated or outraged, let him ponder
the following description of another "H appening," provided in an
issue of Life. Muhl, an Austrian specialist in "H appenings," enacts the
following "Happening," with major assistance from a young girl, a
teacher.
" .. when the girl comes into the arena of folding chairs,
she is veiled in a gauze, and she also wears a graceful smile.
She lies down on a bed of moss placed in the center of the room.
Muhl shadow-boxes privately under the bright spotlights. Gunter Brus, Muhl's partner from Vienna and the ideological
sprecher of the evening, circles the room screaming German
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curses at the crowd. 'Wow! The real concentration camp thing!'
says a spectator.
Then Muhl comforts the girl in vegetables. Her body is
smeared with flour, tomatoes, beer, raw eggs. Melons are smashed inside a gunnysack and Muhl pours the runny results artfully
down on the twisting figure. Then comes dry cereal, wheat
paste, milk, half-chewed carrots. Volunteers rise from their seats
to come forward and chew carrots. Muhl chants and pours in
bright powered paints as he stamps and dances in the spreading
salad. Finally he flings himself into the animal-vegetable marriage. embracing the girl, lapping up the milk and beer. An appealing mood of harvest-time merrymaking descends upon the
room-the audience is spellbound, the girl is radiant at the
bottom of the stew. It is her first Happening-an experience!
"At first you're scared and embarrassed," she says, "but afterward it's just so great."
Now the point of all the preceding is this: any movement whose
followers enjoy the types of activity which we have mentioned above
and whose followers encourage more of the same, is definitely unfit
to be a standard-bearer for the younger generation. Youth has simply
become too dangerous for youth. In the light of the unmitigated
corruption which has enveloped the youth movement, it can clearly
be seen that the ideas and behavior of their elders will furnish the
best influences for youth. Grown-up behavior furnishes them with
the best models to emulate-with the exception, of course, of Peyton
Place. But what can you expect from a small town?

III. Criticism Of Modern Education
Critiques of modern education are particularly dangerous intellectual fare. They tend to convince the student that there are forms
of education which can furnish methods which would be a distinct
improvement over the present ones and which could provide a curriculum, at all levels, that would furnish subject matter which is
superior to that which we now offer. These notions are both disconcerting and absurd. If there were better types of education than those
we are now offering, our educational leaders would long ago have been
among the first to advocate their introduction into our school system.
Only wild-eyed educational dreamers, progressive educators and impractical visionaries imagine that our traditional, educational system
can be improved. In education we are getting the best there is today
( or, at least, what is left of it, anyway) and no student's future is
being neglected by our failing to provide the essentials of education,
from accounting to zoology. Subjects, such as these, have proven
to be the best training for citizenship.
In recent years, however, a number of cranks have turned upcritics of modern education, who have persuaded the more unsuspect-
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ing members of the younger generation, p articula rly those interested
in entering the teaching profession, to become dissatisfied with the
splendid education they a re getting now. These waspish critics dem and
the introduction of such silly a nd new-fangled notions as tha t which
insists upon training students to think straight and to learn the a rt
of dialectic. This is the kind of absurdity promulgated by such cloudcuckoo-land educators as Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler. Or
they may insist on learning by doing, a foolish idea that originated
with the philosopher, John Dewey, who forgot tha t the proven way
by which men have always learned, is to " hit the books."
Then, too, we have the drivel which comes from thinkers whom
the Hippies a nd the Beats swear by. These a re men like Erich Fromm
who created a major disaster by m aking a household word out of
alienation- knowing tha t alienation was a favorite theme of K arl
M arx- and overlooked the fac t tha t a preoccupa tion with alienation
will almost invariably bring a student close to Communism. All those
critics who introduced such fancy terms- like alienation and anom iewant learning to be not separated from life and insist that education
should be made relevant to the life a round us, pa rticula rly the life
with which the student is familia r. But there is an ever-present danger
here, which is almost always overlooked. If students of political
science, for instance, were to be introduced to such gloomy novels
as Edwin O 'Connor's Th e Last Hurrah , or to such serious books as
Frank K ent's Th e Great Game Of Politics, Felknor's Dirty Politics,
M essick's Silent Syndicate, Moscow's What Ha ve You D one For M e
L ately?-or a ny one of dozens of other books in a simila r vein- they
might lose all faith in the basic truths of the political science curriculum.
This is certainly no way to conduct the process of education. Book
learning is still the best way to open up young minds to the richness
of this world . Wha t was good enough for Thomas J efferson should
still be good enough for us. Every effort should be m ade to discourage
the hiring of such critics of education as those we have been referring
to here, no ma tter what their professional specialties.
We cannot afford the luxuries of education tha t a few snobs, like
Robert Hutchins, h ave been pleading for, for years. We cannot afford
the anarchy in education for which dreamers and malcontents, like
Paul Goodman, have been calling for years. Members of the younger
genera tion have to take their place in life as good citizens. They h ave
to acquire those skills which will enable them to find economic niches
for themselves in our scheme of things. They a re right in demanding
basic training and they a re correct in being impa tient with frills. But
because of limited experience they a re often taken in by educators
who are "hung-up" on Pla to or on Scientific M ethod or Social
R esearch or Love and Brotherhood or even Culture. These things are
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all very fine, but they are, essentially, luxuries. We must always
remember tha t, in this practical world , a student must learn FIFO,
if he is to be a good accou nta nt, Titra tion if he is to be a good
chemist, Mechanics if he is to be a good engineer, and English Prose
if he hopes to help write a college catalogue. For these reasons, my
advice to the young is to demand the elimination of frills and to insist
upon an education in basics. This is the best way of ignoring the
irrelevant criticisms of the cranks in education. K eep your faith in the
contemporary curriculum and it will keep faith with you.

*

*

*

*

Limitations of space m ake it impossible to mention all of the other
intellectually and culturally baneful influences which await the unwary
undergraduate. But, I should not like to end this article without, at
least, mentioning some of those undesirable influences here. Among
these undiscussed influences, then, I would include the following:
"Studies Of The Future," made by social scientists ; the content of
liberal weeklies, such as The Nation, The New Republic and The
Commonweal; the philosophy of Logical Positivism; the modern
renascence of Politica l Muckraking; the newer methods of DecisionM aking, such as Operations R esearch ; the little Literary Magazines
and books by such outfits as New Directions; critical analyses of
Communism and Capitalism; Pop Art, Progressive Jazz and what
has come to be called The Expanded Arts: books written by intellectuals and journalists who a re doves in squawks' clothing; studies
by extremist pacifists of every sort; studies in Bohemianism, such as
those by L aw rence Lipton or Seymour Krim or Allen Churchill;
radical magazines edited by already corrupted members of the younger
generation, such as Our Generatio n and New University Thought,
Z en Budd hism, The E vergreen R eview; smart-alecky satire, such as
tha t in Ramparts or Mad magazine ; films and "Happenings" such
as those being developed in wha t has come to be know as "The Expanded Cinema;" and books by such unedifying writers as Jack
K erouac, Alexander King, Jerome Weidman and Norman M ailer,
cartoons by Jules Feiffer, and poetry by Allen Ginzberg and Lawrence
Ferlinghetti.
It is my feeling tha t if the wa rnings given above are taken seriously,
education will be made safe for the younger generation. And if education is made safe for the younger generation, the house of democracy
will be in order. Can one ask for more?
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BOOK REVIEW

The Model Educator and the
Un-Model Student
College Curriculum and Student Protest, by Joseph
University of Chicago Press, Pub. 1969. 303 pp.

J.

Schwab, The

The hirsute graduate on the book jacket is faceless but for
a mouth that seems about to tell it like it is to his alma mater. But
Professor Schwab is only briefly concerned with the verbiage a nd
pyrotechnics of student protest; rather, he writes as a teacher for
teachers at the college level. In a cultivated and sometimes biting
tone, he conducts his class of readers through a tightly organized lesson
plan. By his demonstration, we find our lecturer to be human, well
informed, concerned for our understanding, a scholar in his studies,
a gentleman in his social life, and in all, a friend with "penetrable
reserve" toward his students. He enjoins us to be the same. And
protest as we may that such idealism belongs in "Nowhere," "Utopia,"
or some "Republic" other than this one, the suspicion lingers, like
the acid results of overindulgence, that the old boy is absolutely right.
The medical metaphor used as an organizational scheme is perhaps
a bit too classroomish for comfort, but it is not overstressed, and the
reader soon forgets the antiseptic overtones of the "prescriptive" subsections. In another sense, though, the metaphorically ailing student
"body," is an apt image. The academic corpus is ill because it lacks
the basic unifying cooperation of its cells. The young protest because
they lack proper models, and without models for their lives, they have
no grasp on the old ideals of conduct, ethics, dedica tion, or loyalty.
Without the sense of community engendered by emula tion, the young
lose touch with tradition, find themselves shunted into courses that
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assume goals they cannot see, face an educational process instead
of concerned human educators. We must admit, our lecturer has
all the evidence on his side.
But now he looks closely into our research-dimmed eyes and
announces not only that we are sloppy teachers who care little for
our students, but that we are not gentlemen. Before we can rise to
protest tight schedules, competition, administrative necessity, and the
other exigencies, he outlines a curriculum that might bridge the
schism between thought and action, between rational and affective
worlds. And a moment later, as we are on the point of growing weary
of theorizing, the professor springs on us one of his practical applications: put our students and faculty to work solving actual problems
within the petty bureaucracy of college administration. The impulse
is to shout Huzzah! and collapse with laughter at the thought of a
particular colleague, with three or four of his better students, puzzling
over whether to install a soda bar in the ping-pong room or hire
waitresses to run over from the cafeteria. But on further reflection,
one decides it might be good. It might be very good, very real and
solid and useful, just the antidote for cloudy theoreticians and bored
intellects.
By now, our lecturer has captured our sense of possibility, and we
follow as he illustrates the basic precepts of good teaching. After all,
that is what Professor Schwab is doing here, telling us in detail and by
example how to teach well. His illustrations of "the arts of recovery"
and of the process he calls "simulated deliberation" are enviable,
making us wonder if these could indeed happen in our own class
rooms. We are able to overlook for the moment the impossibilities,
such as reserving a "blank space" in the curriculum for senior undergraduates to exercise some of their learned skills. We dodge the
occasional barbs aimed at our poor teaching and at subject matter
oriented schools for narrow specialties. And we agree that perhaps the
"one man- one brain" concept of education at the college level is
outmoded, tha t perhaps it is time to be communal and cooperative
in education because the real world has been that way for some
time. We may even agree nervously that "characteral instruction" is
necessary, that we must be models of man-and-womanhood, that "being
a mere expert will not do." The existential burden of being an
educator seems heavier now than when we opened the book.
Our lecturer is a man of wide sympathies. He can pause in the
lesson to envisage the lonely administrator standing on his windswept rock, gazing out over the tumultuous academic sea, windblown
but unbowed, poignant in a funny way. And we find too that our
professor's plans are firmly grounded in democratic process and
tradition, that he is squarely American and revolutionary at the same
time. Most importantly, he forces us back, as few have done since
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John Henry Newman, on our personal reserve of good character.
We must walk the edge between "student lover" and academic recluse; we must be model adults, perspicacious men of the world, men
of humor and warmth, concern and mental clarity, paragons for
emulation. It is, we begin to feel uncomfortably, too much. King
Arthur's oath begins to vibrate around us with extra-terrestrial harmonics. And when our lecturer concludes by projecting his ideal college, with jolly teaching fellows and characteral model professors,
reserved but penetrable friends of their students, we begin to feel a
chill, perhaps a vague memory of "Pictures from an Institution" or
"Groves of Academe" with their fragile facades. We feel a sympathetic
joy for our professor's humanness. He has dreams too, though an
autumnal melancholy hangs about his college pastoral. Perhaps the old
h and on the shoulder, the experienced voice in the ear may have less
effect than forecast on our young emulators.
But in all, Professor Schwab has done us a valuable service. We
have always suspected that the good teacher is a model to the student
in his life style as well as in his knowledge and the weight of his
bibliography. Now we have been shown some of the possibilities, concretely presented and planned, for sweeping curricular reform. And
he has laid it on the line for each of us personally: we must become
models for our students because they have no other. We cannot hide
behilnd our professionalism and our technology. The old challenge
is still there: be a Socrates or get out.
R. L. Stallman
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Something Representing Nothing
An Introduction to Hominology, by Theodore C. K ahn, Ph.D., Sc.D .,
Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Pub., 1969. 365 pp.
Among those who adopt the generalist perspective, problems of
professional identity can become acute. Those who look to Hominology
for a solution, however, are in for a disappointment unless they heed
the warning symbolized on the dust cover of Theodore C. Kahn's new
book.
The figure one finds there is an ancient Mayan representation of
zero-"Something representing nothing." Although the notion of
nothingness is likely to be disconcerting for those accustomed to
accenting the positive and eliminating the negative, the author offers
solace in attempting to construct some much needed bridges across the
behavioral and social sciences.
In designating Hominology as a nondisciplinary effort, Professor
Kahn seeks to straddle a landscape which has traditionally provided
poor footing: "A study of total M an." Past failures in this direction
are attributed to the inabilities of interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary
approaches to escape the confines of disciplinary boundaries. To say
that H ominology is nondisciplinary is to equate it with zero; its intended
role is to facilitate the kind of neutrality one needs in order to pursue
an integrated understanding of man.
An advantage of K ahn's presentation is that it is fast paced
enough to retain student interest. Biological, social scientific, and
philosophical issues are woven in and out of various discussions, and
some classroom techniques are described which should be very helpful
in creating more imaginative interactions. One device he has used
with his own student is the "hominologram"-either a histogram or a
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linegraph which students construct as mirrors or how they rega rd
themselves a nd others. The content of the hominologram reflects for
example, the extent to which a ttitudes in life a reas such as religion,
ethics, and politics a re shaped by various "Criteria of R eality." The
author provides six criteria, which other writers have called " ways of
knowing." These a re Authoritarianism, Intuitionism, R a tionalism,
Empi ricism, Pragma tism, and V erbal Structure. The principal values
of the hominologram a re to stimula te discussion and to further inquiry.
It is not presented as a reliable instrument fo r quantification.
The reader is told tha t H ominology represents a new approach to
the study of M an, but there is some difficulty in discovering wha t
this might be. If anything, some of the ideas presented a re a bit old
fashioned. For example: "Theory and hypothesis are often interchanged in general use. Both denote an inference from d a ta a nd both
a re used to explain abstract p rinciples tha t lie behind observed phenomena ." M a ny scientists a nd philosophers would insist tha t this is only
half the story, and not even the most important h alf at that. Wha t is
far more significant is the realiza tion tha t wha t is a datum is largely
determined by one' s theoretical framework a nd the na ture of the
assumptions operative du ring observation. The notion tha t scientists
are primarily involved in da ta collection and interpreta tion tends to
obscure rather than clarify M an's beh avior. Nothing is more abstract
than a fact, nor less defensible in an a nalysis of organism-environment
processes.
Although Professor K ahn's book rep resents the kind of effort
which should be m ade in behavioral studies, there is a likelihood tha t
he has fallen victim to some of the same disciplinaria n tendencies he
decries. In fac t, he seems to rely rather heavily upon psychoanalytic
notions of innate strivings a nd, in particular, he engages in some
very courageous extrapola tions from sources such as Th e T erritorial
I mperative and Th e Na ked A pe. For th is reviewer, it requires a
supreme effort to assume with K ahn tha t, since species such as tigers
or wolves a re too d angerous to each other to engage in intraspecies
killing, lest they become extinct, the solution fo r M an's warlike behavior is for nations to arm to the teeth . " ... the total and complete
eradication of the human species puts a n enti rely differen t com plexion
on a ny wa rlike actions . . . The p roblem .. . is not how to bring abou t
disarmament but, rather, how to create an a rmament tha t would
insure the total destruction of the world and all tha t is in it. Unfortunately, we have not reached tha t point yet. Our a rmam ents are
still too safe."
Earlier in his book, K ahn recommends Dedication as the highest
of man's moral values. T he others a re G races, Virtues, and D u ties.
"Ded ication," he says, "at most can be permitted ; it cannot be
demanded. " Th is further implies, as he points out, the involvement
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of a large number of "degrees of freedom," or lack of compulsions
in behavior. It is a peculiar strain of reasoning that can untangle
this knot! If it is "armament at an unprecedented scale [which will]
bring us the much hoped for universal peace on earth, "it is hard to
imagine how countervailing paranoias will ever permit realization of
man's higher potentials. At most, Dedications under such conditions
are mere shams, and "peace" becomes a parasite that consumes
human becoming.
Although Kahn's "solution" for Man's warring tendency constitutes
only a small part of his book, it nevertheless represents a fatal flaw
running throughout. If man is seen as inherently aggressive, and as
under the sway of some sort of phylogenetic mandate to defend his
territory, then his only hope may in fact lie in a nuclear standoff. If,
however, one adopts the view that humanness arises in part from a
capacity to handle problems symbolically and to substitute imagination
and reason for actual confrontation and coercion, there is no justification for such harsh conclusions concerning the prerequisites for
survival. Nature's key to survival lies in flexibility and a willingness
on the part of the life forms both to play and to be played upon by
currents of force and change. Intelligence is associated with plasticity,
not rigidity. If peace is to be had only at the price of petrification, this
constitutes either a gross contradiction or a firm denial that evolution
has been in the best interests of anyone.
Dick R. Williams

0000000==

77

MINUTES

000

\JDDDo

AGLS Executive Board Meeting
Winter 1969, University of Chicago
Beginning with this issue, October 1969, Perspectives will publish
the minutes of the AGLS Executive Board Meetings as a service to
association members. We are sure that the members of the Executive
Board would welcome some feedback concerning their efforts, and
Perspectives is more than willing to share your reactions with the total
membership if you care to submit them in a letter-to-the-editor.
Members present: Correll, Limpus, Henshaw, Beinhauer, Johnson, LaFauci, Dunham, Carlin, Hodgkinson, Hackel
Malcolm Correll, President presiding:
1. Discussion of new publication

Professor Limpus, Western Michigan University, discussed the plans
for a publication of interest to those involved in general and liberal
education programs. Consensus of the Executive Board was reached
on the following ideas for exploration and implementation.
(a) An active editorial board of the new publication to be drawn
from the membership of the Association
(b) An overrun if possible for free distribution to those in attendance at Colgate meetings
(c) A listing of the officers of the Association to be included in
the publication
(d) An invitation to the membership to submit m anuscripts for
the new publication
(e) A book review section focusing primarily on books of interest
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to higher education rather than being oriented to subject matter
or a discipline
(f) Articles of general interest to teachers in undergraduate programs
(g) Articles of interest to subject matter persons but primarily
pedagogical in orientation
(h) Articles dealing with significant curriculum innovations and
developments
(i) Aim for publication three times a year if possible

2. Attendance at AGLS Conferences and Institutional Travel Policy
It was brought out that since m any college and university travel
regulations limit a faculty member in terms of the conferences he
might attend, p articipa tion in the AGLS conference tends to take
second place to attendance of na tional meetings of the faculty members'
discipline. While no action was taken, discussion followed concerning
the possibility of a questionnaire to the membership to see to what
extent this situation did prevent attendance at the AGLS conference.
One possibility to broaden the representation at the annual AGLS
conferences was to encourage the institutional type membership in
the Association wherein a given institution could designate representatives to go to the AGLS Conference, these representatives then going
as institutional delegates rather than attending as individual faculty
members and thereby having to forego attendance at the meetings
of their discipline.
The President of the Association might compose a letter to college
administrators suggesting this possibility. Present members could also
approach their home institutions with a similar proposal at the time
that travel budgets are being established.

3. The Internship Plan
The relative merits of continuing or discontinuing the internship
programs at the annual meetings were discussed. It was agreed to discontinue the program for interns at least for the coming conference.
4. R eview of the Florida Conference
Mrs. Irmgard Johnson, Program Chairman of the AGLS Conference at the University of Florida, Gainesville, presented a summary report of the conference. The Executive Board unanimously directed the
Secretary of the Association to write a letter to the appropriate officials
at the University of Florida expressing the appreciation of the organization for an excellent conference.
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5. Regional Conferences
The history of the national conference has indicated that each time
a convention is held, attendance seems to be drawn prima rily from the
geographical area in which the meeting is held. Discussion was held
concerning the possibilities of holding regional conferences and a
national conference in alternate years. No action was taken, but the
board indicated an interest in continuing the discussion at later
meetings.

6. Nominating Committee for 1971 Officers
The President was directed to establish a nominating committee
to select a slate of candidates for positions on the Executive Board of
the Association and for vice president under the terms of the Association bylaws.
Douglas Dunham
Secretary
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